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Determining A Proper Test for Inherent 
Distinctiveness in Trade Dress 
947 
Michele A. Shpetner* 
INTRODUCTION 
When Bob Dole used the anti-drug slogan “Just Don’t Do It” 
during his 1996 presidential campaign, he drew a cry of foul from 
Nike, Inc. (“Nike”).1  The sneaker giant accused Dole of stepping 
on its trademark toes by adapting Nike’s “Just Do It” advertising 
slogan to his own uses.2  Fearful of being perceived as endorsing a 
presidential candidate, Nike demanded that Dole abandon the 
catchy motto.3 
Nike told Dole that its catch phrase “Just Do It” was a regis-
tered trademark,4 created and employed to sell athletic gear.5  
Moreover, Nike declared that the public had, over time, come to 
identify the saying with Nike and its advertisements.6  Accord-
ingly, Nike asserted the right to protect the expression “Just Do 
It”—and its permutations—from exploitation by non-Nike enti-
ties.7  Nike viewed Senator Dole’s slogan “Just Don’t Do It” as an 
 
*  Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1998.  Special thanks to Professor Jo-
seph D. Garon of Fordham University School of Law, Rick Chertoff, David Stoller, 
Thomas Shpetner, and my parents Dr. and Mrs. Barry D. Galman. 
1. See Michael Wines, Just Do . . . Whatever, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, § 4 
(Week in Review), at 2. 
2. Id. 
3. See id. 
4. Id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id.  When the public begins to identify a trademark with its source, the 
trademark is said to have acquired “secondary meaning” and receives protection from 
infringers.  See Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the Doc-
trine of Secondary Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 737, 748 (1993); Craig Al-
len Nard, Mainstreaming Trade Dress Law:  The Rise and Fall of Secondary Meaning, 
1993 DET. C.L. REV. 37 (1993). 
7. See McLean, supra note 6; Nard, supra note 6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(1994) (governing trademark and trade dress infringement). 
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infringing use of the Nike trademark,8 thus enjoinable under the 
law.9 
Dole capitulated to Nike’s demand.10  As his campaign staff 
discovered, a trademark is an important aspect of a product’s im-
age, which a company will go to great lengths to protect.11  In gen-
eral, a trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof,”12 that is adopted and used by a manu-
facturer or merchant “to identify his goods and distinguish them 
from those manufactured and sold by others.”13  Where the owner 
of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting a 
product to the public, his investment is legally protected from mis-
appropriation by imitators or trespassers.14  For businesses, trade-
marks are a kind of “badge of honor,”15 because they allow con-
sumers to identify and intelligently choose among products.16  
Misuse of a trademark by an imitator may result in the lost sales 
and tarnished reputation of the original trademark owner, and may 
trick the public into buying fraudulent goods which are not associ-
ated with the trademarked goods.17  As a result, trademark in-
fringement harms both the manufacturer and the consumer.18 
Trade dress—a legal species within the trademark family—
refers to a product or service’s overall appearance and its total im-
 
8. See Wines, supra note 1. 
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (protecting slogans and other trademark devices 
against any use that is likely to cause confusion as to the source of goods or cause a mis-
take as to the affiliations, associations, or connections between persons or producers of 
goods). 
10. See Wines, supra note 1. 
11. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:1 
(4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS]. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
13. Id. 
14. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1275. 
15. 134 CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kasten-
meier). 
16. Id. (“Trademarks are considered the essence of competition, because they make 
possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one 
from the other.”). 
17. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(discussing the possibilities of confusion between similar trademarks). 
18. See id. 
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age presented to consumers.19  By contrast, a trademark appears as 
a name or symbol, and labels a product or service.20  A product’s 
trade dress includes such aspects as the product’s size, shape, 
color, graphics, packaging, label, advertising techniques, and mar-
keting techniques.21  In examining those aspects, courts have 
granted trade dress protection to a broad spectrum of products and 
ideas, including restaurant layouts;22 form letters;23 playground 
equipment;24 designs and packaging relating to brands of ice 
cream,25 cleaning supplies,26 pantyhose,27 vodka,28 lamps,29 and 
 
19. A product or service’s total image implicates a broad spectrum of marks, sym-
bols, design elements and characters.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).  In particular, sec-
tion 1125(a) provides for a cause of action for unprivileged imitation of a distinctive 
trademark or trade dress.  Id. § 1125(a)(1)(a)-(b); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Ca-
bana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1 (1992); Jamison Dean Newberg, The Same Old Enchi-
lada?  The Supreme Court Simplifies the Protection of Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress 
In Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 13 REV. LITIG. 299 (1994). 
20. For example, the McDonald’s golden arched “M” is a trademark, and the corre-
sponding red and gold theme used throughout McDonald’s packaging is its trade dress.  
See McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding 
the use of the name “McBagel’s” infringed McDonald’s trademark).  The court discussed 
the golden arches, and the use of the “Mc” formative with generic food items, such as 
“Egg McMuffin,” “Chicken McNuggets,” and “Big Macs,” among others.  The court 
found that the golden arches and the “Mc”/”Mac” formative were strong trademarks.  Id. 
at 1274.  The court explained that the strength of a trademark depends in large part on 
how distinctive it is, or its tendency to identify goods or services sold under the trade-
mark with the particular source.  Id. at 1270-71.  “The McDonald’s [trade]marks and 
every aspect of its distinctive business, including McDonald’s unique restaurants and 
their golden arches are well known.”  Id. at 1271. 
21. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that while 
trade dress traditionally involved the packaging or labeling of a product, the term now 
includes the shape and design of the product as well) (citing John H. Harland Co. v. 
Clarke Checks, Inc. 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. 
Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987). 
22. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (finding 
Mexican restaurant decor inherently distinctive); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, 
Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding black and white checkered floor and restaurant 
layout inherently distinctive); see also Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131-32 
(8th Cir. 1986) (noting that “section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act] can be used to protect a 
restaurant’s trade dress from confusingly similar imitations but that a competitor cannot 
have exclusive trade dress rights in the mere method and style of doing business”). 
23. See, e.g., Computer Care v. Service Sys. Ent., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(finding car care repair reminder letter inherently distinctive). 
24. See, e.g., Kompan, A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (holding Kompan’s use of curves and colors inherently distinctive). 
25. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) 
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household appliances.30  Trade dress litigation often arises when a 
consumer mistakenly assumes that a product or service is associ-
ated with a source, other than its actual source, due to similarities 
between the two products’ appearances.31 
Trade dress falls within the scope of the Lanham Act,32 the 
primary federal legislation protecting trademarks.  The Lanham 
Act’s underlying purpose is to protect both consumers and com-
petitors from fraud and a variety of misrepresentations of products 
and services.33  To qualify for statutory protection under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act (“section 43(a)”),34 a trademark or trade 
 
(finding square size, bright coloring, and polar bear and sunburst images on the package 
of the “Klondike” ice cream bar protectable as trade dress), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 
(1987). 
26. See, e.g., Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987) (looking at elements such as the color of the packaging, the color of the liquid, 
and the use of a clear rather than an opaque bottle to determine whether trade dress was 
protectable). 
27. See, e.g., Sara Lee v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(holding L’eggs pantyhose trademark and trade dress of an egg inherently distinctive). 
28. See, e.g., Carillion Importers Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Co. Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1559 
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding Stolichnaya Cristall Vodka’s bottle shape and label design pro-
tectable as trade dress), aff’d, 112 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 1997). 
29. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp. Co., Inc. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 
1991) (holding lamp design inherently distinctive). 
30. See, e.g., Bloomfield Indus., Div. of Specialty Equip. Cos., Inc. v. Stewart 
Sandwiches, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 380, 385 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (denying summary judgment in 
coffee maker trade dress case). 
31. See Martin P. Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product Simulation Overview, C913 ALI-
ABA 219, 222 (1994). 
32. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)). 
33. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 8:1, at 282-83.  Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, in pertinent part, provides that: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any work, term, name, symbol, or device or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by 
such act. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 1997). 
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dress must be “inherently distinctive”35 or must acquire sufficient 
secondary meaning to be capable of distinguishing a particular 
business or product from that of another.36 
Trade dress law mirrors trademark law in purpose and avail-
able protections.37  Problems arise, however, because trademarks 
and trade dress are not identical concepts.38  Determining inherent 
distinctiveness in a trademark case is a clear-cut procedure involv-
ing the application of a universally accepted rule;39 however, de-
termining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress is a real snake’s 
nest by comparison.40 
The confusion over “inherent distinctiveness” in trade dress re-
sults from courts’ attempts to apply to trade dress specific catego-
ries of distinctiveness originally developed in the context of trade-
mark litigation.41  While the law is clear that trademark 
classifications apply equally to both trade dress and trademarks,42 
trademark distinctions often do not translate seamlessly to trade 
 
35. See Ronald J. Horta, Without Secondary Meaning, Do Product Design Trade 
Dress Protections Function as Infinite Patents?, 27 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 113, 116 (1993). 
36. See Joel W. Reese, Defining the Elements of Trade Dress Infringement Under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 2 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 108 (1994); see also 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
37. See Horta, supra note 35, at 132. 
38. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006-08 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing trademarks, trade dress, and varying approaches to determining trade dress 
infringement). 
39. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (citing Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
40. See Melissa R. Glieberman, From Fast Cars to Fast Food:  Overbroad Protec-
tion of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
2037 (1993); Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Infringement Litigation 1996:  “The Day of 
the Copycat”, 432 PLI/PAT. 193 (1996); Susan Orenstein, Trademark Protection is Ex-
panded:  Product’s Image Protectable Even If Not Widely Recognized, RECORDER, June 
29, 1992, at 1. 
41. See Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection:  An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 
1379 (1987); Theodore H. Davis, Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution:  The Ra-
tional Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595 (1996); William F. Gaske, 
Trade Dress Protection:  Inherent Distinctiveness As An Alternative to Secondary Mean-
ing, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1136 (1989); Jenny Johnson, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc.:  The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Trade Dress Protection Under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 286 (1993). 
42. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (stating that the 
Lanham Act does not draw a distinction between trademarks and trade dresses, and regu-
lates both); Reese, supra note 36, at 108. 
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dress disputes.43  Specifically, trade dress actions concern shapes, 
colors, and design elements, which do not easily fit within the 
categories designed to suit the words or symbols of a trademark.44  
Because the trademark tests rarely apply smoothly to trade dress 
litigation, federal courts do not universally agree on which charac-
teristics constitute “inherently distinctive” protectable trade 
dress.45  This lack of agreement has led to inconsistent results in 
trade dress actions.46 
Complicating matters further, both the Second and Third Cir-
cuit have recently held that a product’s design, namely the actual 
product itself, rather than solely its packaging, may function as the 
product’s trade dress.47  As a result, these courts not only grapple 
with trademark law as it applies to trade dress, but also split trade 
dress into two distinct camps: (1) product configuration and (2) 
package design.48  Thus, courts not only vary in their approaches to 
defining inherent distinctiveness, but also vary on whether the 
same definition of inherent distinctiveness that applies to a prod-
uct’s packaging should also apply to a product’s configuration.49 
 
43. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).  
The Abercrombie court placed potential trademarks into four categories in an order that 
roughly corresponds to “the degree of [trademark] protection accorded [them]:  (1) ge-
neric; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”  Id. at 9.  Of these 
four categories, the last two, “suggestive” and “arbitrary or fanciful,” are considered to be 
“inherently distinctive,” that is, capable of federal registration without any further proof 
of secondary meaning.  An inherently distinctive mark is any term that is fanciful, arbi-
trary or suggestive and, therefore, under trademark law does not require secondary mean-
ing for legal protection.  See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 11:2, at 11-15; 
see also Johnson, supra note 41; James E. Stewart & H. Michael Huget, Trade Dress:  
Protecting a Valuable Asset, 74 MICH. B.J. 56 (1995) (discussing properties of inherently 
distinctive trade dress). 
44. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 700 
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Reese, supra note 36, at 104-05. 
45. See Kane, supra note 40 (surveying the landscape of disagreement among courts 
regarding the qualifications of inherently distinctive trade dress); see infra Part II (dis-
cussing various tests employed by different courts). 
46. See Kane, supra note 40. 
47. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
48. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 
1994); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
49. See Nancy Dwyer Chapman, Trade Dress Protection in the U.S. After the Su-
preme Court Decision in Two Pesos, 387 PLI/PAT. 7 (1994); see, e.g., Duraco Prods., 
Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs 
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To make matters worse, a related trademark concept known as 
“secondary meaning” is often confused as a synomym for inherent 
distinctiveness.  In fact, the two concepts are separate links on a 
chain.  Inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning are the 
heart and soul of trade dress protection,50 because if a mark is not 
found to be inherently distinctive, the court may nonetheless pro-
tect the mark if the litigant can prove the existence of “secondary 
meaning.”51  Secondary meaning is viewed as “acquired inherent 
distinctiveness,” which exists when “everybody knows”52 that a 
product’s trade dress indicates the source of the product.  For ex-
ample, the Third Circuit has held that it is common knowledge that 
a small, three-dimensional square puzzle with moving parts, made 
up of orange, white, blue, and yellow squares is a “Rubik’s 
Cube.”53  The Rubik’s Cube has thus acquired secondary meaning 
over time, and the buying community identifies the product’s trade 
 
Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
50. Distinctiveness, generally, is a trademark classification term meaning that the 
mark is unique or different in such a way that it will automatically be capable of distin-
guishing a producer’s goods or services from those of its competitors.  See Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).  “Inherent distinctiveness” 
exists if a trademark has been classified as “arbitrary or fanciful” because it possesses 
features that neither assist in describing the product nor functionally assist in the prod-
uct’s effective packaging.  See Chapman, supra note 49, at 20.  The factors used to de-
termine inherent distinctiveness include determining whether the trademark is considered 
to be uncommon, unique or unusual in a particular market.  See id. at 17.  Unlike inherent 
distinctiveness, “secondary meaning” is concerned with whether the trademark actually 
identifies the source of particular goods, not whether the trademark is capable of identify-
ing a particular source.  See id. at 17. The judicial doctrine of secondary meaning is well 
settled, and recognizes that a descriptive word, phrase or image, after a period of time and 
exclusive association with particular goods or services, can identify the goods or services 
with their producer.  See Gaske, supra note 41, at 1123.  Essentially, secondary meaning 
is equivalent to the concept of buyer association, and has nothing to do with the 
distinctiveness of the packaging as it relates to the product itself.  See id. 
51. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992); see Reese, su-
pra note 36, at 108 (defining the established common law Abercrombie & Fitch spectrum 
of categories used to classify the levels of distinctive trademarks). 
52. Horta, supra note 35, at 113; see also Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, 
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding restaurant motifs virtually identical, and 
noting that if “trade dress is inherently distinctive, the further requirement of a showing 
of secondary meaning should be superfluous”). 
53. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982) (de-
sign of “Rubik’s Cube” protected as trade dress). 
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dress with its specific source: Rubik.54  Acquiring secondary mean-
ing is predominantly the means by which an otherwise unprotect-
able mark may obtain protection.55  Although inherent distinctive-
ness and secondary meaning are two different concepts, a finding 
of either leads to trademark and trade dress protection.56 
Controversy exists because, in many trade dress cases, courts 
have melded secondary meaning and inherent distinctiveness into 
one giant concept, instead of keeping the ideas separate.57  These 
courts erroneously label this composite as “inherent distinctive-
ness.”58  The trade dress rulings of such courts are inconsistent 
with the rulings of courts that properly distinguish between secon-
dary meaning and inherent distinctiveness.59 
When courts intertwine ingredients of secondary meaning with 
inherent distinctiveness, they deny protection to otherwise valid 
inherently distinctive trade dress, absent a showing of secondary 
meaning.60  This runs counter to the Lanham Act, which requires a 
finding of either secondary meaning or inherent distinctiveness.61  
Nevertheless, court rulings based on the erroneously mixed con-
cept remain technically consistent with the mandates of the Lan-
ham Act, although ideologically inconsistent with the Lanham Act 
 
54. See McLean, supra note 6, at 745; Chapman, supra note 49. 
55. See Horta, supra note 35; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763 (1992). 
56. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. 
57. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco 
Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994); see also McLean, 
supra note 6. 
58. See, e.g., Knitwaves, 71 F.3d 996; Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d 1431. 
59. Compare Chevron Chem., 659 F.2d at 702-03 (holding trade dress inherently 
distinctive because arbitrary and fanciful according to the Abercrombie trademark spec-
trum), with Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d 1431 (holding trade dress not inherently distinctive 
because of a lack of secondary meaning; Abercrombie spectrum was discussed by the 
court and completely disregarded). 
60. See Chapman, supra note 49, at 11, 14-15 (noting that in Two Pesos the Su-
preme Court criticized the Second Circuit’s position in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body 
Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), that “unregistered marks did not enjoy the 
‘presumptive source association’ found in registered marks, and so needed to prove sec-
ondary meaning”); see also Joan L. Dillon, Two Pesos:  More Interesting for What It 
Does Not Decide, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 77 (1993); Stewart & Huget, supra note 43. 
61. 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West 1997); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763 (1992). 
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Act itself.62 
The 1992 Supreme Court decision in Two Pesos v. Taco Ca-
bana63 spurred a flurry of new activity in the area of trade dress 
protection by addressing this issue of merging the concepts of in-
herent distinctiveness and secondary meaning.64  In Two Pesos,65 
the Supreme Court set out to resolve the circuit split regarding the 
requirements for protecting inherently distinctive trade dress.  The 
Court held that a Mexican restaurant’s inherently distinctive trade 
dress motif was protectable despite a lack of secondary meaning.66  
The Court’s ruling echoed the Lanham Act’s language that trade 
dress was protectable from infringement if it was either “inherently 
distinctive,” or had acquired “secondary meaning.”67  By articulat-
ing the “either/or” standard,68 the Court’s opinion upheld a major-
ity of circuit decisions which narrowly applied the trademark test 
for inherent distinctiveness to trade dress cases.69  The opinion 
 
62. See Chapman, supra note 49, at 15-16 (noting that the Court in Life Industries 
Corp. v. Ocean Bio Chem. Inc. said that the inherently distinctive standard is less strin-
gent than the secondary meaning standard); see also Dillon, supra note 60. 
63. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).  The court found that “trade dress” is the total image of the 
business, and found that Taco Cabana’s trade dress included the shape and general ap-
pearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor 
plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers’ uniforms, and 
other features reflecting on the total image of the restaurant.  Id. at 764. 
64. See Chapman, supra note 49, at 17-20 (discussing the Court’s ruling that non-
functional trade dress is protected under the Lanham Act); see also Dillon, supra note 60.  
Just prior to the decision in Two Pesos, the climate in the field of trade dress litigation 
was really heating up.  See, e.g.,  Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, 
Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV. 769, 779 (1991) (stating that while trade dress 
protection is not new, recently there has been “exponential growth” in number of trade 
dress cases); Jere M. Webb, The Law of Trade Dress Infringement:  A Survey of Recent 
Developments, COMPUTER LAW, Sept. 1991, at 11 (noting tremendous increase in number 
of trade dress infringement cases in recent years). 
65. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
66. See id. 
67. See id. at 769. 
68. See Horta, supra note 35, at 113. 
69. See, e.g., Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F. 2d. 1342 
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the design was not the primary means of identification 
such that, with no secondary meaning, likelihood that the mark would be confused with 
opposers mark was not established); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 
1986) (holding that plaintiff’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, so that secondary 
meaning issue did not need to be addressed); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchas-
ing Groups, 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that with a showing of likelihood of 
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categorically abandoned secondary meaning requirements for in-
herently distinctive trade dress.70 
Specifically, Two Pesos held that if trade dress is inherently 
distinctive under the Lanham Act, secondary meaning need not be 
proven.71  Unfortunately, while the court afforded protection to in-
herently distinctive trade dress, it did not specify exactly what con-
stituted “inherent distinctiveness.”72 
The effects of the Two Pesos decision extend beyond a $3.7 
million judgment and a court order to renovate the rooflines and 
color schemes of Two Pesos’ restaurant decor.73  While the Su-
preme Court effectively resolved the long-standing dispute among 
the Courts of Appeals74 and sent a clear message that trade dress 
protection would not depend on a showing of secondary mean-
ing,75 the Court left the door open for creative interpretations of in-
herent distinctiveness.76  As Two Pesos did not include guidelines 
or criteria for determining what combination of elements qualified 
as being “inherently distinctive,” the Supreme Court effectively 
left circuit courts to fashion definitions of their own.77 
One consequence of Two Pesos is the assortment of current 
tests, inconsistently applied, to determine “inherent distinctive-
ness” in trade dress litigation.78  The existence of multiple tests has 
yielded a variety of results.79  Commentators have found that the 
 
confusion secondary meaning is not required), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). 
70. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (finding that a determination of inherently distinctive did not require proof of 
secondary meaning). 
71. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771, 775. 
72. Id. at 776. 
73. See Dillon, supra note 60. 
74. In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court overruled the Second Circuit, and upheld the 
Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ rule regarding the necessity of showing secondary 
meaning when trade dress is inherently distinctive.  See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772; dis-
cussion infra Part I.F. 
75. See Newberg, supra note 19, at 310. 
76. See Chapman, supra note 49. 
77. The Two Pesos opinion did not set parameters for determining inherent distinct-
iveness, resulting in controversy among circuit courts as to whether stricter standards 
should be applied to evaluate protectability for product configurations (shape of actual 
product) as compared with overall packaging appearance.  See Kane, supra note 40. 
78. See infra Part II (discussing tests). 
79. See infra Part II (exploring the various results of different tests).  See generally 
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existence of so many disparate tests and approaches to determining 
inherent distinctiveness in trade dress can harm new businesses as 
well as established products, and can prescribe rather than prohibit 
confusion and unfair competition.80  In fact, a manufacturer’s trade 
dress rights could be helped or harmed based solely on the law-
suit’s jurisdiction.81  The need for a canonical “test” is mandated, 
and is crucial to resolving what has been called one of the “most 
difficult issues in all of trade dress law.”82 
This Note argues that courts apply too many inconsistent tests 
to ascertain whether trade dress is inherently distinctive, producing 
results that vary widely from circuit to circuit.  Part I outlines the 
relationship between trade dress and trademark, then analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Two Pesos, which designated either 
inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning as the core of trade 
dress protection.  Part II examines the aftermath of Two Pesos, in-
cluding the various circuit court definitions and tests for inherent 
distinctiveness—a concept not precisely defined by the Supreme 
Court.  Part III proposes a universal test to identify inherent dis-
tinctiveness in trade dress.  This Note concludes that such a clear 
and uniform test is needed to end the circuit-to-circuit inconsisten-
cies in determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress. 
I. TRADEMARK AND TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 
In Two Pesos, the Court held that trade dress is “distinctive” if 
it is either “inherently distinctive” or has acquired “secondary 
meaning.”83  While secondary meaning was clearly defined by the 
court, inherent distinctiveness was not.84  This part surveys trade-
mark and trade dress protection, and the applicable law that gov-
erns both.  Sections A, B, and C analyze the facets of inherent dis-
tinctiveness in the trademark and trade dress arenas.  Section D 
 
Chapman, supra note 49. 
80. See Stewart & Huget, supra note 43; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772; 
Newberg, supra note 19. 
81. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (discussing various circuit court tests for inherent distinctiveness, and the results); 
see also Stewart & Huget, supra note 43. 
82. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 600. 
83. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992). 
84. See id. 
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examines section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which regulates both 
trademark and trade dress infringement cases.  Section E explains 
the basic principle of “distinctiveness” in trade dress, and distin-
guishes the notions of “inherent distinctiveness” and “secondary 
meaning.”  Section F reviews the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
“inherent distinctiveness” in the 1992 Two Pesos decision. 
A. Trademark Classifications: The Abercrombie & Fitch 
Spectrum 
Fundamentally, trade dress and trademarks are related con-
cepts; both involve a product or service’s overall image.85  None-
theless, as this section explains, the two concepts focus on different 
aspects of that image.  This section explores how trademarks differ 
from trade dress. 
A trademark is a word, name, or symbol that identifies a par-
ticular good or service.86  Well-known trademarks include the 
word Xerox for a brand of photocopy machines,87 the name 
Kleenex for a brand of tissues,88 and the circular hood ornament 
used on all Mercedes Benz automobiles.89 
 
85. Id. at 768. 
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
87. See Diane Kiesel, Protecting a Good Name is a Never-Ending Fight, 71-Mar 
A.B.A.J. 62 (1985).  Kiesel wrote that: 
When thirsty restaurant patrons want a cola, they’ll sometimes ask their waiter 
for a Coke.  When a man nicks his face with a razor, he’ll fumble through the 
medicine cabinet and, chances are, he’ll mutter, “Where are the Band-Aids?” 
rather than “Oh, for an adhesive bandage!”  When the boss wants copies of a 
report, chances are, he or she will say, “Give me ten Xeroxes,” instead of 
“Make ten photocopies.” 
Id. at 62. 
88. Words like Xerox and Kleenex came close to losing their trademark status be-
cause such a large section of the general public started calling all copy machines “Xerox 
machines” and referring to all types of tissue as “Kleenex.”  Both companies work hard 
to police the usage of their trademarks and to preserve their trademark status.  One strat-
egy is making sure that the word Xerox is never used alone, thus coming to represent the 
generic item that is a photocopy machine.  Every advertisement for Xerox states the 
trademark name next to the item:  “Xerox brand office machines.  Likewise, “Kleenex” is 
the coined trademark and “tissues” is the generic term for the product.  See id. at 62. 
89. See Baila H. Celedonia, Review of Basic Principles of Trademark Law, 432 
PLI/PAT. 7 (1996); see also Mozart Co. v. Mercedes Benz of North Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 
1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987).  Other trademarks commonly used as generic names for 
products include:  Baggies plastic bags, Fiberglas glass fibers, Jeep vehicles, Jell-O gela-
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The formula for determining inherent distinctiveness in a 
trademark is devoid of mystery.90  Judge Friendly outlined the now 
classic test for determining a trademark’s distinctiveness in the 
well-known case Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World.91  Under 
the Abercrombie test, trademarks are classified as (1) generic, for 
marks that tell what the product is, not where it came from; for ex-
ample, aspirin92 or thermos;93 (2) descriptive, for marks that 
merely describe the product; for example, “Lite” for lower-calorie 
beer;94 (3) suggestive, for marks that denote a quality or trait of the 
product in a way that requires the exercise of some degree of 
imagination; for example, Coppertone suntan lotion95 or Chicken 
of the Sea tuna fish;96 (4) arbitrary, where a common word is used 
 
tin dessert, Q-tips cotton swabs, Saran Wrap plastic film, Sheetrock gypsum wallboard, 
Styrofoam plastic foam, and Vaseline petroleum jelly.  See Kiesel, supra note 87, at 63. 
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125; see also Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, 537 
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
91. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
92. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that a 
generic trademark has lost its connection with a particular source, and is identified by the 
public as the genus or class of which the individual product or service is a member); see 
also Bristol-Myers Co. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 151 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (finding 
infringement of “Bufferin” trademark when a department store labeled its product “Buff-
ered Aspirin,” but advertised it as “Bufferin,” thus tending to render the “Bufferin” 
trademark generic and descriptive). 
93. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 
1963) (holding that “Thermos” became generic when a substantial majority of the public 
did not know that word had trademark significance); see also Coca-Cola Co., v. Over-
land, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding the federally registered trademark 
“Coke” has not become generic for cola). 
94. See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 
1977) (holding that “‘light’ is a common descriptive word when used with beer, as well 
as in other similar contexts, and neither such word nor its phonetic equivalent, for exam-
ple the misspelled version “lite,” could be appropriated as a trademark for beer”), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
95. See Douglas Lab. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.) (holding 
that “Coppertone” for suntan lotion was suggestive, not descriptive, and was eligible for 
trademark protection), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954).  The Douglas Lab. court clari-
fied that suggestive trademarks are inherently distinctive, and are afforded the greatest 
protection because their intrinsic nature serves to identify the particular source of the 
product.  Id. 
96. See Van Camp Sea Food Co., Inc. v. Alexander B. Stewart Orgs., 50 F.2d 976, 
979 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding that “Chicken of the Sea” as a trademark for use on canned 
tuna fish is not descriptive, but suggestive, and newcomer trademark applicant cannot 
register the term “White Chicken” for use on canned tuna fish because “White Chicken” 
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outside its normal context in a mark; for example, Camel ciga-
rettes97 or Ivory soap;98 or (5) fanciful, where a word or symbol is 
invented for use as a trademark; for example, Exxon gasoline99 or 
Kodak film.100 
As a rule, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are always 
considered to be inherently distinctive,101 and thus, always qualify 
for statutory protection.  The rationale is that suggestive, arbitrary, 
 
is merely descriptive, and is confusingly similar to “Chicken of the Sea.”). 
97. See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990, 998 (W.D. 
Mo. 1986) (stating that “Camel” for cigarettes is arbitrary in that “[it is] found in the dic-
tionary but [does] not describe or suggest the [product] to which [it] is related”).  An arbi-
trary mark consists of a word, symbol or picture which has a commonly understood 
meaning, but which, when used in conjunction with particular types of goods or services, 
does not suggest or describe any aspect, quality or characteristic of those goods or ser-
vices.  See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 11:4, at 350; see, e.g., Arrow 
Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941) (holding that “Ar-
row” liquors is a highly protectable, arbitrary, and fanciful mark); Greyhound Corp. v. 
Rothman, 84 F. Supp. 233 (D. Md.) (holding that “Greyhound” is a highly protectable, 
arbitrary, and fanciful mark for a bus line), aff’d, 175 F.2d 893 (1949). 
98. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(preventing unfair competition by prohibiting Vess from using the term “chocolate 
fudge” on its diet chocolate soda cans).  The court used Ivory soap as an example of an 
arbitrary term for soap versus products made from ivory elephant tusks.  Id. at 906. 
99. See Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (finding that Exxon was an “invented” word, had become a household name, and 
was subject to the broadest trademark protection).  The court also found that there was no 
likelihood of confusion between Xoil and Exxon, because they begin with different let-
ters of the alphabet and were not similar as trademarks.  Id. 
100. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoin-
ing a comedian from using the stage name “Kodak,” as it would dilute Eastman Kodak’s 
very strong, fanciful trademark name, and might suggest some sort of sponsorship or 
partnership between the two parties).  The term fanciful as a classifying concept in 
trademark law is usually applied to words or concepts invented solely for their use as 
trademarks.  See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 11:3, at 347; see, e.g., 
Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1927) (holding 
that “Cutex” cuticle-removing liquid is a protectable, fanciful mark); Clorox Chem. Co. 
v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that “Clorox” bleach is 
a fanciful mark). 
101. Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are considered inherently distinctive, 
in that their “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product” or they 
are “capable of identifying a particular source of a product,” whether or not the trade 
dress has acquired secondary meaning or a wide public association with the source.  Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992) (citing Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 
at 4); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 184 (1985) (citing Ab-
ercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9). 
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and fanciful marks are unique marks by definition.102  If a mark is 
descriptive, however, it is not deemed inherently distinctive.103  
The only way a descriptive mark can receive protection is when 
the plaintiff can establish that the mark has acquired secondary 
meaning.104  Thus, for a court to find a descriptive mark to be dis-
tinctive, the plaintiff must prove that consumers associate the 
trademark specifically with the plaintiff’s product.105  For example, 
buyers associate the Nike “swoosh” with Nike athletic gear, even if 
the word “Nike” does not appear with the swoosh. 106 
Inexorably, generic marks, the final category, are never pro-
tectable, due to their widespread, every-day placement in the Eng-
lish language, and because they are incapable of identifying a par-
ticular source of a product.107  For example, Visa challenged 
American Express by asserting that a “platinum card,” is a generic 
term.108  Visa argued that the phrase “platinum card,” like “gold 
card,” is available for use by the world at large, and should not be 
protected as a distinctive American Express trademark.109  Visa 
successfully maintained, in an out of court settlement, that Ameri-
can Express should not be the only credit card company allowed to 
legally offer a “platinum card” level of service bearing that 
name.110 
The application of the Abercrombie & Fitch spectrum111 re-
 
102. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 4. 
103. See id. 
104. In order for a descriptive mark to become distinctive, a plaintiff must prove 
secondary meaning, which is consumers’ association between the mark and its source 
that has developed over time.  See id. at 9. 
105. See id.; see also Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 
577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the Abercrombie test for classification of trade-
marks). 
106. See Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enter., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (hold-
ing Nike had been granted trademark protection from non-parody reproduction of 
Swoosh stripe), rev’d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
107. Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992). 
108. American Express Is Sued by Visa USA Over Platinum Cards, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 18, 1996, at B2. 
109. In the past, American Express also lost rights to the generic term “gold card.”  
Id. 
110. Legal Affairs:  The Card Industry Settles Its Platinum Feud, CREDIT CARD 
NEWS, Aug. 15, 1997, at 1. 
111. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
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cently led to victory for the makers of L’eggs pantyhose.  In Sara 
Lee v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,112 the Fourth Circuit protected the 
trademark “L’eggs” as applied to pantyhose, preventing Kayser-
Roth from using the name “Leg Looks” for their brand of panty-
hose.113  The Fourth Circuit found the name “L’eggs” to be sugges-
tive, and therefore entitled to protection, as it imaginatively sug-
gested a trait of the product.114  The court noted that “although the 
mark [‘L’eggs’] may not be wholly fanciful (because it is phoneti-
cally identical to a common word) or arbitrary (because it is not ac-
tually a ‘real’ word), it is unquestionably suggestive, and therefore 
a strong, distinctive mark.”115  Thus, Kayser-Roth was estopped 
from using “Leg” as the first word of their product’s name because 
the “L’eggs” trademark was found to be so strong and inherently 
distinctive based on the Abercrombie classification system.116 
B. Trade Dress 
Trade dress is the packaging and product design that makes up 
the overall look of a product or service.117  For example, Klondike 
Ice Cream Bars are square in shape, and wrapped in pebble-
textured silver foil, and feature a picture of a navy blue polar bear 
and a shining sun.118  These arbitrary aspects, taken as a whole, 
make up Klondike’s trade dress.119  This section discusses trade 
dress and what makes it inherently distinctive. 
The distinctiveness of Klondike’s trade dress was litigated in 
 
1976). 
112. 81 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 1996). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 465. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. See Newberg, supra note 19, at 307; LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 
F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 
966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co., v. Brikam Int’l, Inc. 814 F.2d 
346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987). 
118. See AmBrit Inc., v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
119. See id.  Klondike’s choices comprise arbitrary and unique ice cream marketing 
techniques.  See id. at 1531.  Klondike chose silver foil, the square, non-wooden stick 
shape of the bar, and the graphics on the packaging without regard for the content of the 
product to be sold.  See id. 
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AmBrit v. Kraft.120  The court evaluated Klondike’s packaging 
along three lines of inquiry: (1) whether Klondike’s shape or de-
sign was common; (2) whether Klondike’s shape or design was 
unique in the ice cream bar field; and (3) whether Klondike’s 
shape or design was merely a refinement of an already well-known 
form of ornamentation for ice cream goods.121  The court answered 
each of these questions in the negative, and held that the Klondike 
bar was inherently distinctive and thus worthy of trade dress pro-
tection.122 
The court stated that animals, specifically polar bears, had no 
natural association with ice cream, and were chosen arbitrarily to 
signify Klondike ice cream bars.123  In addition, the court noted 
that ice cream bars were typically wrapped in paper or cellophane, 
and Klondike’s decision to use foil was a creative choice not pre-
viously seen in the ice cream market.124  Similarly, Klondike’s de-
cision to utilize a silver foil wrapper, despite the wide range of 
available colors, was unique.125  Klondike’s preference for foil 
with a pebbled rather than a smooth texture, and without designs 
such as snowflakes to enhance the wrapper, was also innovative 
and particular to Klondike ice cream bars.126 
The AmBrit court noted that another ice cream bar manufac-
turer could certainly manufacture square ice cream bars, and even 
use a polar bear picture on the packaging, but could not copy the 
total combination of Klondike’s shape and package elements.127  
Otherwise, consumers might reach for a package of Klondikes, but 
 
120. 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
121. See id. at 1536 (citing Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 
854 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. BarWell Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 
1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977))). 
122. See id. at 1536-37. 
123. See id. at 1536-37. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. Id.; see also Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 
1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (discussing that a frozen vegetable package can potentially be in-
herently distinctive); Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that a chair’s overall look and design can be inherently distinctive); Stuart 
Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a notepad’s de-
sign can be inherently distinctive). 
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end up with another brand of ice cream bars that are not of the 
same quality, nor are what the consumer really intended to pur-
chase.128  Klondike put a great deal of thought, marketing, strategy, 
and money into not only maintaining the quality of their ice cream 
bars, but in making sure that when consumers reach for the silver 
polar bear packaging, they get what they pay for, instead of a 
fraudulent or “copycat” product.129  Trade dress law, therefore, 
functions to protect both Klondike from loss of sales, and consum-
ers from confusion.130 
When evaluating the Klondike trade dress, the Ambrit court, 
like most trade dress courts, did not look at each design element in 
a vacuum.131  If one element of Klondike’s trade dress was found 
to be common, it would not necessarily have resulted in Klon-
dike’s trade dress being denied “inherently distinctive” status.132  
The court evaluated each element of Klondike’s trade dress, and 
subjected the total combination of these elements to the court’s 
three-pronged test.133  The court thus ultimately held that Klon-
dike’s trade dress was “inherently distinctive” because its packag-
ing comprised random elements which were unique to the ice 
cream market.134 
Importantly, the court recognized that consumers’ impressions 
are a completely separate issue from determining whether the ac-
tual product is distinctive within its specific market niche.135  In 
reaching its decision, the court did not consider how consumers 
 
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (seeking to protect consumers from confusion 
and manufacturers from unfair competition). 
129. See Ambrit, 812 F.2d at 1547-49. 
130. Id. at 1535-36. 
131. See id. at 1537; see also Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp 
595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing numerous prior trade dress cases, and federal cir-
cuit courts’ proclivity to evaluate trade dress as a whole, rather than examining each indi-
vidual component of trade dress in and of itself). 
132. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537; see also Kompan, A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 
890 F. Supp. 1167, 1173-74 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding overall look of playground 
equipment can be inherently distinctive, even if individual trade dress elements are com-
mon when examined individually). 
133. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537. 
134. See id. 
135. Id.; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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viewed Klondike’s trade dress,136 or their reactions to Klondike’s 
foil and polar bear packaging, nor did it attempt to ascertain 
whether the average consumer thought that Klondike’s packaging 
was striking or memorable.137  Instead, the court focused on the 
choices Klondike made when designing its packaging, and com-
pared those choices to similar products in Klondike’s specific mar-
ket.138  This type of analysis purposely narrowed the court’s inves-
tigation to distinguishing whether the product shape and packaging 
was distinctive in the product’s market, and intentionally avoided a 
determination of whether consumers considered the packaging to 
be unique.139 
The problem that plagues trade dress attorneys is that the three 
pronged Klondike test is by no means the national standard for de-
termining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress litigation.140  In 
fact, since no universal, archetypal test exists, there are multiple 
versions of two, three, and four pronged tests being applied all 
over the country.141  Courts continuously fashion new tests based 
on subjective interpretations of what is “inherently distinctive.”142  
In addition to the Klondike test,143 other accepted tests include: the 
Krueger chair test,144 the Duraco plastic container test,145 the Knit-
waves sweater test,146 the Seabrook frozen vegetables test,147 and 
the Chevron gardening and lawn bottles test.148  These various 
 
136. Ambrit, 812 F.2d at 1537; see also McLean, supra note 6. 
137. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537. 
138. Id. at 1540. 
139. Id. at 1541. 
140. See infra Part II (discussing an assortment of tests currently employed by vari-
ous courts). 
141. See Chapman, supra note 49. 
142. See infra Part II (discussing cases); see also Kreuger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, 
Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (2d Cir. 1996) (listing and explaining the variety of differing “in-
herent distinctiveness” tests used by courts across the nation). 
143. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1531. 
144. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (2d Cir. 1996). 
145. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
146. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
147. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 
1977). 
148. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 700 
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). 
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trade dress tests are not uniform.149  Commentators have argued 
that this confusion occurs because both the Lanham Act and Su-
preme Court have unequivocally defined the concept of “distinct-
iveness,” while no binding authority has defined the meaning of 
inherent distinctiveness.150  Courts therefore create their own reci-
pes for determining what makes a feature “inherently” distinctive, 
and resulting definitions vary from courtroom to courtroom.151  
Problematically, each test relies on different factors to determine 
inherent distinctiveness in trade dress, even though the Lanham 
Act does not protect designs on sweaters any differently than it 
protects designs on frozen vegetable packaging.152 
C. The Synthesis of Trademark and Trade Dress 
This section states the conclusive test for determining inherent 
distinctiveness in a trademark, and contrasts this clear formula with 
the uncertain approach for determining the same issue in trade 
dress. 
The criteria for establishing inherent distinctiveness in trade 
dress are murky and unresolved.153  As many courts have observed, 
the Abercrombie classifications do not translate easily to certain 
aspects of the trade dress context.154  For example, the Abercrom-
bie trademark test is easily applied when the trade dress involves 
product packages and labels, which, like trademarks, have the ad-
vantage of using words and symbols independent of the product to 
 
149. See infra Part II (discussing cases); see also Chapman, supra note 49. 
150. See Chapman, supra note 49, at n.10; Dillon, supra note 60; Glieberman, supra 
note 40; Johnson, supra note 41, at 286; Newberg, supra note 19; see also 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a) (1994); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
151. See infra Part II (discussing varying approaches courts take to determine inher-
ent distinctiveness in trade dress); see also Chapman, supra note 49. 
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
153. “This issue of inherent distinctiveness is a real snake’s nest.  When it comes to 
a word, you can pretty easily tell. . . .  But try to apply that same kind of analysis to neon 
lights or vinyl seating in a restaurant.  Where do you go here?  Is a light inherently dis-
tinctive?”  Orenstein, supra note 40, at 1 (“[W]e have no guidance on what inherently 
distinctive means, and there are going to be a lot of optimistic people filing cases to help 
us define it.”). 
154. See Krueger, Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
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convey information to consumers.155 
Applying the Abercrombie trademark test, however, becomes 
daunting when it comes to product designs, as illustrated by the 
conflict in Krueger International, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc.156  In 
Krueger, the court found the design and overall look of a 
Krueger’s chair to be inherently distinctive, and prevented Night-
ingale from making and marketing an exact copy of the Krueger 
chair.157  The court was faced with the Abercrombie conundrum: 
Does the shape of a chair seat “suggest” a chair seat?  Does it “de-
scribe” a chair seat?  Or is it just a chair seat?158  Can an industrial 
product, such as a chair seat, no matter how beautifully designed, 
transcend its common properties and be “arbitrary,” “fanciful,” or 
“suggestive” of the chair seat maker? 
This dilemma of applying the very literal, word-centered 
trademark law to the more visual aspects of trade dress law has led 
some courts to treat trade dress issues differently, depending upon 
the type of trade dress involved.159  In fact, a split has developed 
whereby some courts apply Abercrombie’s “arbitrary, fanciful or 
suggestive” trademark test only to trade dress issues involving a 
product’s package and the design of the package.160  These courts 
assert that they cannot properly apply the Abercrombie test to trade 
dress cases that focus on a product’s shape or configuration.161  
Yet, other courts make no distinction between product configura-
tion and product packaging, and attempt to apply Abercrombie’s 
classification system to both.162 
Unlike packaging, a product’s configuration is the product it-
 
155. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 583-
84 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding No. 12 Ouzo label and bottle to be inherently distinctive). 
156. 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 601. 
159. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco 
Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). 
160. See Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 
1431 (3d Cir. 1994). 
161. See Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 
1431 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Reese, supra note 36. 
162. See, e.g., Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 595 (citing numerous cases that applied the 
Abercrombie classification system to product configuration and product packaging alike). 
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self, as opposed to what it is wrapped in.  Some courts allege that 
since the product itself is on the line, it deserves special considera-
tion, regardless of where it falls on the Abercrombie spectrum.163  
Therefore, while it is well settled that trademark law generally 
governs trade dress law, there is controversy over (1) whether to 
divide trade dress law into two distinct camps, namely, package 
design and product configuration, and (2) trademark law’s role in 
determining inherent distinctiveness in product configuration 
cases.164 
D. Statutory Protection for Infringement 
Although there are some conceptual differences between 
trademarks and trade dress, the Lanham Act statute165 makes no 
distinction between the two, and broadly governs both trademark 
and trade dress infringement actions.166  This section explores the 
underlying premise of the Lanham Act, and what it seeks to pro-
tect. 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not draw a distinction 
between trademarks and trade dress.167  The Lanham Act’s purpose 
is to secure to a mark’s owner his business’ reputation, and to pro-
tect a consumer’s ability to distinguish among competing prod-
ucts.168  The statute thus fosters the producer’s interest in maintain-
 
163. Id. 
164. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d 996; Duraco, 40 F.3d 1431; Roslyn S. Harrison, Trade 
Dress Law in the U.S., Western Europe, and Pacific Rim Countries, 488 PLI/PAT. 461, 
468 (1997). 
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
166. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that 
trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under the Lanham Act without 
showing that it has acquired secondary meaning). 
167. See id. at 770. 
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The statute provides that: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any work, term, name, symbol, or device or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by 
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ing his product’s quality by imputing the producer with the bene-
fits of his product’s good reputation.169  The statute simultaneously 
protects a consumer’s ability to distinguish among competing pro-
ducers, by preventing valid trademarks or trade dress from being 
copied.170 
1. Infringement 
While trademark infringement focuses on one aspect of a prod-
uct’s “image,” trade dress infringement focuses on the “total image 
of a plaintiff’s product, package and advertising and compare[s] 
this with the defendant’s image.”171  A trademark differs from a 
product’s trade dress because it signifies a symbol that has come to 
represent a product.172  For example, Nike’s trademark swoosh 
symbol signifies a Nike product, even if the actual word “Nike” is 
not present on the product.173  Trade dress is slightly more complex 
because it consists of a combination of symbols that, taken to-
gether, comprise a product’s overall look.174  For example, a tennis 
shoe’s overall image involves the shape of the toe, the color of the 
shoelaces, the colors and design of the sole of the sneaker, the 
stitching on the sneaker’s exterior, the type of holes the laces go 
through, and the shape, color, and texture of the total shoe.  These 
trade dress elements, however, do not automatically represent a 
Nike product in the tennis shoe market the way that seeing Nike’s 
swoosh automatically represents a Nike product, even when the 
 
such act. 
Id. 
169. See id. § 1127; see also Park ‘N Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly Inc., 469 U.S. 
189, 198 (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3-5) (1946) (citations omitted)). 
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 
2.05[4], at 2-29. 
171. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 11, § 8:1, at 282-83 (quoted in M. 
Kramer Mfg. Co., v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n. 25 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding video 
poker game trade dress infringement)). 
172. See Reese, supra note 36, at 108-09 (stating that a trademark—a word or sym-
bol—must be capable of distinguishing a particular product or business from another); 
see also Two Pesos, Incv. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
173. See Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Ent., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding 
Nike had been granted trademark protection from non-parody reproduction of Swoosh 
stripe), rev’d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
174. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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word “Nike” does not appear.175 
An example of distinctive trade dress is exemplified by Le-
sportsac bags.  In the early 1980s, LeSportsac popularized durable 
lightweight nylon luggage and handbags featuring unique tan 
trimming marked with the LeSportsac name logo.176  All retailers 
marketing cheaper, less durable versions of this bag design were 
enjoined from continuing because LeSportsac’s tan trimming and 
design were deemed inherently distinctive trade dress.177 
2. Litigation 
In a trade dress action, like a trademark action, the fact finder 
must separately determine three things per the Lanham Act: (1) 
whether a product is distinctive, or if not, has acquired secondary 
meaning;178 (2) whether a purchaser will likely be confused as to 
the source of the product;179 and (3) whether the trade dress is 
“functional.”180  The court will not even reach the question of like-
 
175. See Nike, 799 F. Supp. at 894. 
176. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding 
lightweight luggage bag inherently distinctive). 
177. See id. 
178. Secondary meaning is known as “acquired distinctiveness” and exists when the 
public, over time, begins to identify a product with its source.  See supra notes 50-59 and 
accompanying text; infra Part I.E.2 (discussing secondary meaning). 
179. See, e.g., Lesportsac, 754 F.2d at 71 (finding lightweight luggage bag inher-
ently distinctive). 
180. Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
Trade dress is deemed “functional” if the shape of the product, or the product’s packag-
ing is dictated by the functions it performs.  Id. at 605.  The court in Krueger relied on 
standards set forth in AmBrit, discussed infra Part II.B.2, and Seabrook, discussed infra 
Part II.B.1.  If trade dress is functional, no amount of secondary meaning or consumer 
confusion will turn the design into a trademark.  See E. Lynn Perry, The Supreme Court 
Gives Two Pesos’ Worth - Trade Dress and the Franchise Trademark Portfolio, 12 FALL 
FRANCHISE L.J. 35, 40 (1992); see also Bloomfield Indus., Div. of Specialty Equip. Cos., 
Inc. v. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 380, 385 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (denying sum-
mary judgment in coffee maker trade dress case).  In Bloomfield, the court relied on stan-
dards set forth in AmBrit and Seabrook, as well as Chevron, discussed infra Part II.B.3.  
The focus of this Note is to analyze the standards used to determine inherent distinctive-
ness in trade dress, not to discuss consumer confusion and trade dress functionality.  Spe-
cifically, Part I.E distinguishes between the concepts of inherent distinctiveness and sec-
ondary meaning.  Part II examines differing circuit court “tests” used to ascertain inherent 
distinctiveness in trade dress.  The standards considered include whether trade dress is 
intended as source identification, see Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d 
Cir. 1995), whether trade dress is arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive in relation to the prod-
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lihood of confusion in the marketplace until persuaded that the pu-
tative mark or dress is sufficiently distinctive to warrant prima fa-
cie protection.181  Thus, a finding of distinctiveness under the 
Lanham Act protects the public from experiencing confusion, mis-
take, and deception in the purchase of goods and services, while 
simultaneously protecting the integrity of the trademark owner’s 
product identity.182 
The Lanham Act’s criteria are not easily satisfied, as evidenced 
in Blau Plumbing Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc.183  In Blau Plumbing, a 
special city map in Blau Plumbing’s yellow pages advertisement 
was not subject to either trade dress or trademark protection, and 
the company’s competitor, S.O.S. Fix-It, was permitted to use a 
similar map in their advertising even though it was admittedly cop-
ied from Blau Plumbing.184  The court stated that the Blau Plumb-
ing map was simply the company’s way of saying “We serve all of 
Milwaukee”—which is a descriptive slogan, thus not distinctive 
enough to qualify for either trademark or trade dress protection.185  
Importantly, the court stated that “[i]t would not do to give Blau 
 
uct, see Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995), whether a product 
has a unique overall look, see Kreuger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), whether the trade dress is unusual and a memorable source identifier, 
see Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994), whether 
a product’s look is unique in a particular market, see Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well 
Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977), functionality, see Chevron Chem. Co. v. 
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1126 (1982), and whether the product’s combination of trade dress elements is unique in 
a particular field, see Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
181. See Blau Plumbing Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986). 
182. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (stating 
that an airplane logo can be an incontestable trademark and that “the Lanham Act pro-
vides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the 
goodwill of his business, and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among 
competitors”). 
183. 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a drain cleaning company’s 
yellow pages advertisement not subject to trade dress protection; secondary meaning not 
required if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark).  In Blau Plumbing, the court 
reasoned that “[t]here is probably no substantive legal difference between [the terms trade 
dress and trademark].”  Id. at 608. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. at 609 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.3d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
SHPETNER.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
972 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:947 
more protection for its . . . [advertisement] . . . conceived as ‘trade 
dress’ than it would be entitled to if the box [advertisement] were 
called a common law trademark.”186 
Thus, although one company made an exact copy of a compet-
ing company’s advertisement, and was potentially defrauding con-
sumers while stealing the competing company’s sales, the copying 
was permissible because the original advertisement was not found 
to be distinctive enough to warrant protection from “copycats.”187 
E. Distinctiveness 
Both the Supreme Court and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
specify that trade dress must be distinctive in order to receive pro-
tection from infringement.188  “Distinctiveness,” in general, is de-
fined as whether the appearance of the product is sufficient to “al-
low consumers to identify the product from the trade dress.”189  
The general rule regarding distinctiveness in trade dress is clear: an 
identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected if it 
either (1) is inherently distinctive, or (2) has acquired distinctive-
ness through secondary meaning.190  This section explains the um-
brella concept of distinctiveness, and the difference between inher-
ent distinctiveness and secondary meaning. 
A finding of a product’s overall distinctiveness is crucial to 
trade dress protection.191  Distinctiveness can be proven two differ-
ent ways: by determining a product’s inherent distinctiveness, or 
 
186. Id. at 608. 
187. Id.  S.O.S. Fix-It’s yellow pages advertisement was found to be a direct imita-
tion of Blau Plumbing’s advertising, which was not distinctive enough to warrant trade 
dress protection.  The Seventh Circuit discussed how inconsistency, inequity, and confu-
sion would result from treating trade dress infringement differently than trademark in-
fringement under the Lanham Act.  See id.  In Blau Plumbing, Judge Posner noted that 
“‘[t]rade dress,’” a commonly used term in the law of unfair competition, denotes the 
form in which a producer presents his brand to the market . . . .  If a seller adopts a trade 
dress confusingly similar to a competitor’s, this is unfair competition actionable under 
section 43(a).”  Id. at 608. 
188. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
189. Bauer Lamp. Co., Inc. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 13, at 37-38, and Comment 
A (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990). 
191. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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determining that the product has acquired distinctiveness in the 
marketplace over time.192  Per the Supreme Court, and the Lanham 
Act, the notion of uniqueness in the marketplace (inherent distinct-
iveness) should be kept separate from the notion of consumer rec-
ognition acquired over time (secondary meaning).193 
Some courts mesh these two different ideas together, and thus 
confuse determining inherent distinctiveness with determining sec-
ondary meaning.194  This can best be illustrated by a hypothetical 
example. 
In certain jurisdictions, the Tide laundry detergent package 
could be deemed inherently distinctive because the court finds that 
over time, consumers have begun to associate the bright orange 
box, the yellow swirl, and the use of bold black letters with Proctor 
and Gamble’s Tide laundry detergent.  These jurisdictions examine 
not the product and its design, but consumers’ perceptions regard-
ing the product and its design.  Thus, these jurisdictions actually 
seek to establish secondary meaning, but define this process as 
seeking to establish inherent distinctiveness. 
In other jurisdictions, Tide laundry detergent would be denied 
status as inherently distinctive trade dress, because rather than fo-
cusing on consumer awareness, the court would find that the use of 
bright colors and bold letters is prevalent throughout the laundry 
detergent market, and that numerous other detergents use the same 
colors, box size, box shape, and bold letters, albeit in different 
combinations.  These jurisdictions might find that Tide’s package 
design was not unique in its particular market, thus not worthy of 
protection.  These jurisdictions correctly examine the product and 
its design, in and of itself, to determine whether it is inherently dis-
tinctive. 
1. Inherent Distinctiveness 
One of the most difficult analytical issues in trade dress law is 
determining whether a product design is “inherently distinctive.”195  
 
192. See id. 
193. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)). 
194. See id. 
195. See Krueger Int’l, Inc, v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Trade dress is inherently distinctive if the design, shape, or combi-
nation of elements are so unique in a particular market, that one 
can assume, without proof, that they could automatically be per-
ceived by the customer as indicia of origin—a trademark.196  The 
Seventh Circuit will not even consider protecting trade dress—
even if there is a likelihood of confusion between competing trade 
dresses—until it first determines that inherent distinctiveness has 
been established.197  Essentially, this inquiry asks whether the la-
beling and packaging of one product is unmistakable enough on its 
face to be different from other similar products, and could thus be 
recognizable by consumers as having a specific origin or source.198 
For example, Marlboro’s trade dress in cigarette advertise-
ments is protected because, prior to the Marlboro Man and Marl-
boro Country, no other cigarette manufacturer had evoked the im-
age of the American West for the purpose of selling cigarettes.199  
 
1996).  Importantly, when trade dress is deemed “inherently distinctive,” it qualifies for 
statutory protection against infringers.  See id.; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that trade dress is inherently distinctive since it is ca-
pable of identifying products or services as coming from a single source). 
196. See AmBrit Inc., v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
197. Rock-A-Bye Baby, Inc. v. Dex Prods., Inc., 867 F. Supp 703 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(summary judgment denied in trade dress case involving stuffed bear toys for infants).  In 
Rock-A-Bye Baby, the court relied on Two Pesos, discussed infra Part I.F (citing Spraying 
Sys. Co., v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding spray nozzle not 
inherently distinctive)). 
198. Carillion Importers Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Co., 913 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 
1996).  The trade dress of Stolichnaya Cristall Vodka creates an overall impression that is 
inherently distinctive.  The court found that unlike the intricately shaped bottles of Abso-
lut, Finlandia, and other vodkas in evidence before the court, Stolichnaya Cristall em-
ploys a conventionally shaped, clear glass wine bottle that is stamped “Made in the 
U.S.S.R.”  The bottle has a black plastic neck wrapping and a narrow black label.  The 
decorative touches on the label include the product’s name in prominent white and gold 
lettering, gold scrollwork around the product’s name, and small red lettering below the 
name that touts the product’s characteristics.  The bottle also has a second small label 
comprised of four overlapping gold medallions that is located on the neck of the bottle.  
Despite the commonplace use of some of these individual components in the marketing 
of alcoholic beverages other than ultra premium vodkas, their use here is a fanciful addi-
tion to the vodka market.  See id. at *4 (“Combined, these components have an elegant, 
minimalist style that is suggestive of refinement and quality.  Such a design is distinctive 
in the vodka marketplace and protectable as trade dress.”). 
199. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (holding Marlboro’s Western trade dress inherently distinctive). 
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The Southern District of New York found that Marlboro’s usage of 
the western motif was unique in the cigarette market, and regard-
less of actual consumer awareness, consumers could potentially be 
aware of that fact.200 
2. Secondary Meaning 
If a product is not “inherently distinctive,” the fact finder must 
determine whether that product has acquired “secondary mean-
ing.”201  Secondary meaning renders a trade dress protectable if the 
originator of the trade dress can prove two things: (1) that the trade 
dress identifies the source of a product; and (2) that there is a like-
lihood of confusion202 between the original trade dress and the 
trade dress of the allegedly infringing product.203  It is important to 
note that the Lanham Act never explicitly mentions secondary 
meaning, except when ultra-specifically discussing descriptive 
trademarks, which are not considered inherently distinctive.204 
Secondary meaning is acquired over time, and exists when the 
purchasing public has come to associate the trade dress with the 
particular source of the product.205  For example, the Nike 
“swoosh” has become equivalent to the actual word “Nike” as an 
indicator of source for sneakers and athletic gear.206 
 
200. See id. 
201. Secondary meaning is sometimes referred to as “acquired distinctiveness,” and 
is established when “the user of . . . a trade dress has shown that by long and exclusive 
use in the sale of the user’s goods, the [dress] has become so associated in the public 
mind with such goods that the [dress] serves to identify the source of the goods and to 
distinguish them from those of others.”  Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 
870 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding potpourri pillow-shaped package with ribbon tie not inher-
ently distinctive), reh’g denied, 1994 U.S. App., LEXIS 26010 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 1994). 
202. When determining the likelihood of confusion, a court must consider the type 
of trademark, similarity of design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and 
purchasers, identity of the advertising media utilized, actual confusion, and intentional 
copying.  See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. Supp 1336, 1345 (N.D. 
Ill. 1988) (holding exercise bike acquired secondary meaning). 
203. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see also Wallace 
Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing ornamental silverware design not subject to trademark protection), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 976 (1991). 
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
205. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766 n.4. 
206. See Nike, Inc. v. Leslie, 1987 WL 13664, at *1 (M.D. Fla.) (finding “the marks 
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A very high standard of proof is needed to establish secondary 
meaning.207  Specifically, trade dress with secondary meaning must 
fulfill the primary function of identifying the plaintiff.208  The 
plaintiff’s mere association with the trade dress is not sufficient.209  
The existence of secondary meaning can be determined by examin-
ing (1) direct consumer testimony, (2) consumer surveys, (3) ex-
clusivity of trade dress use, (4) length and manner of use, (5) 
amount and manner of advertising, (6) amount of sales and number 
of customers, (7) established place in the market, and (8) proof of 
intentional copying.210 
In an effort to elucidate the concept of inherent distinctiveness, 
many courts have, perhaps unintentionally, melded the concept of 
secondary meaning into their definition of inherent distinctive-
ness.211  Instead of focusing solely on a product’s uniqueness in the 
marketplace when attempting to determine inherent distinctive-
ness,212 certain courts shift their focus from the package itself to 
the consumers’ associations with the product’s configuration.213  
These courts improperly base their rulings on the secondary mean-
 
Nike, the Swoosh Design, and Nike & Swoosh Design are each arbitrary, fanciful and 
strong trademarks, and are afforded the broadest ambit of protection from infringing 
uses”); see also Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Ent., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (grant-
ing Nike swoosh and slogan trademark protection from non-parody reproduction), rev’d 
on other grounds, 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
207. Secondary meaning is acquired over time as consumers begin to associate a 
product with the product’s source.  It is important to note that secondary meaning is only 
established when consumers absolutely identify the product with its source.  See McLean, 
supra note 6, at 749-50. 
208. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 582-
83 (2d Cir. 1993). 
209. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(finding shape of cable ties used to bundle wires not indicative of secondary meaning), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996). 
210. See, e.g., Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assoc., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 
1989) (finding Daytona Beach poster did not acquire secondary meaning); Bloomfield 
Indus. Div. of Spec. Equip. Cos., Inc. v. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 380 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (finding coffee maker capable of having protectable trade dress). 
211. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
212. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976), discussed supra Part I.A. 
213. See, e.g., Knitwaves, 71 F.3d 996 (wool sweaters); Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d 
1431 (plastic urns). 
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ing aspect of trade dress, never addressing the substance of inher-
ent distinctiveness claims.214  Much controversy exists because 
when certain courts examine trade dress, rather than questioning 
whether it is inherently distinctive, and identifies a product’s 
source, they are actually contemplating whether the trade dress has 
acquired secondary meaning.215  Incorporating secondary meaning 
as part of the definition for inherent distinctiveness is in direct vio-
lation of the Supreme Court’s specific holding that trade dress can 
be protectable if it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired 
secondary meaning.216 
F. The Supreme Court’s 1992 Ruling 
This section analyzes the Two Pesos decision, and the conflicts 
arising therefrom.  Although Two Pesos settled a circuit split, the 
Court’s decision opened the floodgates for an assortment of tests, 
inconsistently applied, to determine inherent distinctiveness in 
trade dress.217 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.218 involved a dispute be-
tween two Mexican restaurants, Taco Cabana and Two Pesos, con-
cerning their similar festive decor, which included colorful umbrel-
las and awnings, patio dining, bright paintings and murals, and 
decorative Mexican artifacts.219  Taco Cabana alleged unfair com-
petition and trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.220  The district court and circuit court ruled that Taco 
Cabana’s trade dress was protectable, and in fact had been copied 
and infringed upon by Two Pesos.221  Both courts held that the 
combination of elements in Taco Cabana’s trade dress was not 
merely descriptive of the type of food served in the restaurant, and 
 
214. See Stewart & Huget supra note 43. 
215. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995). 
216. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
217. See Chapman, supra note 49, at 42 n.10; Dillon, supra note 60; see also Greg 
L. Pehlman, Unfair Competition —Infringement Claims Under the Lanham Act—Relaxed 
Standards for Protection of Distinctive Trade Dress, 60 TENN. L. REV. 449 (1993). 
218. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id.; see also Newberg, supra note 19, at 300. 
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was capable of serving as an indicator of source.222  They granted 
an award of $3.7 million and ordered Two Pesos to radically alter 
the overall design of its restaurants.223 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling, thus resolving a perennial conflict between the 
Second and Fifth Circuits regarding the necessity of showing “sec-
ondary meaning” when a trade dress is inherently distinctive.224  
The Court stated that trade dress is protectable if it is either inher-
ently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning.225  The 
Court’s decision thereby pronounced that if trade dress is inher-
ently distinctive, it is protectable from the outset.226  Therefore, a 
finding of inherently distinctive trade dress eradicates the need to 
prove secondary meaning, since secondary meaning is no longer 
considered to be part and parcel of proving inherent distinctive-
ness.227  The Two Pesos decision further clarified that trade dress is 
not protectable if it is merely in the process of acquiring secondary 
meaning, and that the actual existence of secondary meaning must 
be proven in lieu of proving inherent distinctiveness.228 
 
222. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see also Newberg, 
supra note 19, at 300. 
223. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 
1991).  Incidentally, the rival chains continued to litigate after the Supreme Court’s ruling 
because Two Pesos allegedly furthered customer confusion by not adhering to the Su-
preme Court’s order to alter its trade dress.  See Bill Carlino, Trade Dress Distress:  Su-
preme Court Ruling May Be Cat’s Meow for Companies Set to File Copycat Lawsuits, 
NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWSPAPER, Nov. 9, 1992, at 1.  In 1993, Taco Cabana an-
nounced that it would acquire all of Two Pesos restaurant assets for approximately $22 
million.  Taco Cabana President and CEO Richard Cervera noted, sarcastically, that con-
verting existing Two Pesos restaurants would be “aided by the very striking physical re-
semblance of the two chains.”  Greg Hassell, A Tex-Mex Merger:  Taco Cabana Gets Its 
Two Pesos Worth, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 13, 1993, at B1. 
224. The Fifth Circuit did not require proof of source identification (secondary 
meaning) to show that trade dress is inherently distinctive.  For example, the court in 
Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982) focused primarily on the arbitrariness of the 
trade dress and its relevance to the product.  In contrast, the Second Circuit required 
proof of both arbitrariness of trade dress as well as proof of consumer source identifica-
tion, thereby including proof of secondary meaning as a requisite for inherent distinctive-
ness.  See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
225. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992). 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
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Two Pesos unified the standard for trademark and trade dress 
law, and held once and for all that protection for trade dress re-
quires either inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning, but 
not both.229  The Two Pesos decision codified the majority rule fol-
lowed by the Fifth,230 Seventh231 and Eleventh Circuits,232 but 
overruled the Second and Third Circuits233 which previously com-
bined the concepts of inherent distinctiveness and secondary mean-
ing under the singular definition of “inherent distinctiveness” in 
trade dress.234 
Since secondary meaning is no longer required, whether a 
product is deemed inherently distinctive is vital to whether or not a 
company’s trade dress receives protection from potential infring-
ers.235  Importantly, Two Pesos did not set out a clear test as to 
when a given combination of elements will be deemed inherently 
distinctive as a whole,236 and accepted the lower court jury finding 
of “inherent distinctiveness” without ever reviewing or examining 
the criteria the jury used in making this finding.237  The Court did 
 
229. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770. 
230. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 
1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763, reh’g denied, 505 U.S. 1244 (1992). 
231. See Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enter., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992) (find-
ing car care repair reminder letter inherently distinctive). 
232. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(finding athletic shoes not inherently distinctive). 
233. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
234. See Chapman, supra note 49, at n.10; Dillon, supra note 60; Glieberman, supra 
note 40; Johnson, supra note 41, at 286; Newberg, supra note 19; Stewart & Huget, su-
pra note 43; see also Brown, supra note 41, at 1379; Davis, supra note 29; Gaske, supra 
note 41, at 1136; Kane, supra note 40. 
235. See Nard, supra note 6. 
236. See McLean, supra note 6. 
237. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765.  The district court instructed the jury that: 
Trade dress is the total image of the business.  Taco Cabana’s trade dress may 
include the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the 
identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equip-
ment used to serve food, the servers’ uniforms and other features reflecting on 
the total image of the restaurant. 
Id. at 764 n.1.  The court of appeals accepted this definition and quoted from Blue Bell 
BioMedical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989), that “[t]he ‘trade 
dress’ of a product is essentially its total image and overall appearance.”  Two Pesos, 505 
U.S. at 764 n.1.  The jury was also instructed that to be found inherently distinctive, the 
trade dress must not be descriptive.  Id. at 766 n.3.  In its Two Pesos decision, the Su-
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not give an explicit definition, and left the concept of “inherent dis-
tinctiveness” largely ambiguous.238  District courts have thus been 
left to wrestle with the inevitable question: just how inherently dis-
tinctive must trade dress be to warrant protection?239 
The Two Pesos ruling may be interpreted as beneficial for 
newer, smaller businesses which create a special look, style, or 
product, because that look would be protected from the day the 
business opens its doors,240 or the day the product enters the mar-
ket.241  Competitors of an inherently distinct trade dress owner are 
more likely to attempt to steal or appropriate the trade dress at the 
outset of its use, rather than after the trade dress has been used in 
the market for a long period of time.242  This is likely to result in a 
financial loss to the developer of the trade dress if the trade dress is 
not deemed inherently distinctivene from the start.243 
In light of the Two Pesos decision, a business considering entry 
into the marketplace is now be able to introduce its new goods or 
services bearing a distinctive design, with the security that the law 
will protect its concept at the outset.244  The new business will not 
have to administer comprehensive, costly statistical surveys to es-
tablish that customers actually associate its trade dress with its 
 
preme Court held that trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under sec-
tion 43(a) without a showing that is has acquired secondary meaning: 
Section 43(a) neither mentions nor contains the concept of secondary meaning, 
and where secondary meaning does appear in the Lanham Act, is as a require-
ment applying only to merely descriptive marks and not to inherently distinc-
tive ones.  Engrafting a secondary meaning requirement onto § 43(a) also 
would make more difficult the identification of a producer with its product, and 
thereby undermine the Lanham Act’s purposes of securing to a mark’s owner 
the goodwill of his business and protecting consumers’ ability to distinguish 
among competing producers.  Moreover, it could have anticompetitive effects 
by creating burdens on the start-up of small business. 
Id. at 763. 
238. See David Klein, The Ever-Expanding Section 43(a):  Will The Bubble Burst?, 
2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65 (1993). 
239. See generally Stewart & Huget, supra note 43 (discussing the elements of the 
distinctiveness analysis). 
240. Id. 
241. See Carillion Importers Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Co., 913 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 
1996). 
242. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767-71. 
243. Id. at 774-75. 
244. See Newberg, supra note 19, at 311. 
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business, nor will it have to prove that customers are actually con-
fused about the ownership of similar design concepts.245 
The Two Pesos ruling could be viewed alternatively as having 
anticompetitive results, by allowing potential monopolization of 
certain looks, styles or products.246  Some commentators see Two 
Pesos as a radical extension of trademark law that guarantees an 
onslaught of litigation because protection would be given to con-
cepts that would not otherwise qualify for copyright or patent reg-
istration and protection.247  Commentators have predicted that de-
signs that do not qualify for copyright or patent protection may 
unfairly be given trade dress protection under the broadest reading 
of Two Pesos,248 which would grant a perpetual monopoly to the 
first user of a product’s design. 
II. VARIOUS TESTS CURRENTLY USED BY COURTS TO DETERMINE 
INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS IN TRADE DRESS 
This part enumerates the differing circuit court tests currently 
used to ascertain whether trade dress is inherently distinctive, by 
 
245. Id. 
246. See Gleiberman, supra note 40; Johnson, supra note 41. 
247. Because trade dress protection extends to the overall packaging or design of a 
product, even if a product’s individual components are not protectable, manufacturers of 
patentable designs will likely seek protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
rather than under copyright or patent law.  In comparison to copyright protection, which 
generally lasts only for the life of an author plus fifty years, and patent protection, which 
lasts fourteen years, trade dress protection may extend indefinitely.  See Johnson, supra 
note 41, at 307. 
248. See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., No. 94 CIV.7631, 1995 WL 
464906,  at *3  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1995) (holding that patent law would be undermined if 
protection given to trade dress). 
The focus of this Note does not explore trade dress copying as it relates to patent law 
or copyright law.  In a recent Second Circuit decision the court noted that although trade 
dress may supplement copyright and patent law by protecting unpatentable product con-
figurations and novel marketing techniques, overextension of trade dress protection can 
undermine restrictions in copyright and patent law that are designed to avoid monopoliza-
tion of products and ideas.  Consequently, courts should proceed with caution in assess-
ing claims to unregistered trade dress protection so as not to undermine the objectives of 
these other laws.  See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., No. 94 CIV.7631, 1995 WL 
464906 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1995) (quoting Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 
F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995) (addressing the allegation that a greeting card manufacturer would 
gain a monopoly on a distinctive type of greeting card by claiming that the distinctive 
features of that type are part of its protected trade dress). 
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diagramming the contrasting interpretations and analytical ap-
proaches developed by district courts following Two Pesos.249 
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts to unify trade dress and 
trademark law in Two Pesos,250 the problem remains that currently 
no standard approach to determining inherent distinctiveness in 
trade dress has been adopted by all courts.251  Courts have devel-
oped many different tests to determine inherent distinctiveness in 
trade dress, and the existence of multiple tests—varying from 
courtroom to courtroom252—leads to inconsistent results in grant-
ing trade dress protection.253 Importantly, different circuit courts 
use different “tests” for inherent distinctiveness, hence the out-
come of a trade dress action can vary based solely on jurisdic-
tion.254 
Such incongruity is exemplified by comparing two New York 
cases, Krueger International, Inc. v. Nightingale,255 and Knitwaves 
Inc., v. Lollytogs Ltd.256  The courts in these two cases employed 
their own special “tests” for inherent distinctiveness, and these 
tests bore no resemblance to each other. 
In Krueger, the court held that the overall look of a chair257 
was protectable trade dress when a competitor produced an exact 
 
249. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
250. See Two Pesos, Inc., v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
251. See Chapman, supra note 49. 
252. See infra Part II.C.3 (examining the criteria used by the Krueger court in de-
termining inherent distinctiveness). 
253. See infra Parts II.C.1-3 (comparing Duraco with Stuart Hall and Krueger); see 
also Chapman, supra note 49. 
254. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“[W]e applied the ‘more discerning’ ordinary observer test and compared only the pro-
tected portion of the design.”); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 
1995); Kreuger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Duraco 
Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994); Seabrook Foods, 
Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Chevron Chem. Co. v. 
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1126 (1982); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d 
Cir. 1993); see also Davis, supra note 29. 
255. 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
256. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding “squirrel” and “leaf” children’s sweater 
designs are not inherently distinctive). 
257. The Matrix chair is a strong, lightweight, stackable chair.  Krueger, 915 F. 
Supp. at 607-08. 
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copy of the chair.  The court found that the individual design ele-
ments of the chair served both “aesthetic and source-identifying 
purposes.”258  The Krueger court established that the chair was 
inherently distinctive by using standards in direct opposition to a 
prior Second Circuit case,  Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.259 
The Knitwaves court held that a design’s primary purpose can 
be either aesthetic or source identifying, but not both, and evalu-
ated inherent distinctiveness by whether the manufacturer intended 
to use the design “to identify the source and distinguish his or her 
goods.”260  The Krueger court rejected Knitwaves’ “false dichot-
omy between aesthetics and source-identification,”261 and con-
cluded that the Matrix chair had a “distinctive”262 and “unique”263 
overall look and that manufacturers “generally seek unique designs 
as an important source identifier.”264  The Krueger court reached 
its decision by applying the principles of several of the other exist-
ing “tests” implemented in other circuits.265 
This part reviews the assortment of tests currently used to de-
termine inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.  Section A revisits 
the pivotal trademark case, Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting 
World, Inc.266  Section B isolates package design cases and the 
conflicting tests used to determine inherent distinctiveness in trade 
dress.  Section C distinguishes product configuration cases and 
analyzes divergent circuit court tests used to determine inherent 
 
258. Id. at 607.  The court went on to state that “[a]lthough each of the individual 
design elements serves both functional and aesthetic purposes, it is the overall look that 
[we] must consider.” Id. at 607 (citing Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, 
Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (1995)). 
259. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
260. Id. at 1008. 
261. Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. The test the Krueger court applied included a combination of factors culled 
from the court opinions in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 
(2d Cir. 1976), discussed infra Part II.A; Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 
(8th Cir. 1995), discussed infra Parts II.C.2, III.B; Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well 
Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977), discussed infra Part II.B.1; and Chevron 
Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
457 U.S. 1126 (1982), discussed infra Part II.B.3. 
266. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed infra Part II.A. 
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distinctiveness. 
The cases discussed illustrate the present dispute concerning 
whether package design cases267 should be treated differently from 
product configuration cases.268  Although both package design and 
product configuration are considered trade dress,269 some courts 
assert that a product’s shape (configuration) can never be inher-
ently distinctive per the Abercrombie spectrum.270  These courts 
aver that secondary meaning must always be proven in order for 
product configuration to receive protection.  This conception 
seems to require courts to skirt around the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Two Pesos271 which afforded protection to trade dress that is ei-
ther inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning.272 
A. The Abercrombie & Fitch Spectrum 
The classic test for determining a trademark’s distinctiveness 
was outlined in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.273  
The Abercrombie spectrum is widely accepted in many trade dress 
infringement court opinions, and is universally accepted in trade-
mark case decisions.274 
The basic factors that courts consider are the degree to which 
the trademark or trade dress is generic, descriptive, suggestive, ar-
bitrary, or fanciful.275  Many courts across the country incorporate 
the Abercrombie spectrum into their versions of inherent distinct-
iveness tests.276 
 
267. Package design refers to a product’s container, label or overall appearance.  
See Kane, supra note 40, at 200. 
268. Product configuration refers to the shape of the product itself.  See id. 
269. See id. 
270. See, e.g., Health O Meter, Inc. v. Terrallion Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 n.5 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (questioning whether such is actually the law of the Seventh Circuit). 
271. 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see supra Part I.F (discussing the Two Pesos case). 
272. Certain courts have divided trade dress into two subsections:  product configu-
ration and package design, and hold that stricter standards of proof are required to deter-
mine inherent distinctiveness in product configuration.  See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs 
Ltd., 71 F.3d 966 (2d Cir. 1995); discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
273. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
274. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Newberg, supra note 19, at 311. 
275. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. 
276. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992); Jeffrey 
Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1995); Paddington 
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B. Package Design Cases 
Although the Supreme Court does not distinguish product con-
figuration trade dress cases from package design trade dress 
cases,277 this section demonstrates that other courts have made this 
distinction when determining inherent distinctiveness of trade 
dress.  Package design cases refer to a product’s container, label, or 
overall appearance.278  Product configuration cases involve the 
shape of the product itself.279  Courts differ on whether Abercrom-
bie280 should apply to all trade dress cases—both package design 
and product configuration—to neither, or to one or the other.281 
Although the applicability of the Abercrombie classifications to 
trade dress was not at issue in Two Pesos, the Court noted that the 
Fifth Circuit below had applied the Abercrombie classifications to 
the trade dress issue and discussed them without disapproval.282  
Certain circuits continually apply the Abercrombie & Fitch spec-
trum283 to trade dress infringement cases involving package de-
sign.284  These circuits seem to have adopted Justice Thomas’ con-
currence in Two Pesos, in which he clearly supported applying the 
Abercrombie & Fitch system to trade dress.285 
 
Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583-84  (2d Cir. 1993). 
277. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
278. See Kane, supra note 40 at 200. 
279. See id. 
280. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
281. See analysis infra Parts II.B and II.C (discussing product configuration, pack-
age design, and everything in between). 
282. 505 U.S. at 767; see Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 
1120, n.8 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Paddington, 996 F.2d at 583 (2d Cir. 1993). 
283. See supra Part I.A (discussing Abercrombie & Fitch). 
284. See Stewart & Huget, supra note 43; see also Duraco, 40 F.3d 1431 (discuss-
ing cases involving package design as opposed to product configuration). 
285. Justice Thomas wrote that: 
Over time, judges have come to conclude that packages or images may be as 
arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive as words or symbols, their numbers limited 
only by the human imagination.  A particular trade dress, then, is now consid-
ered as fully capable as a particular trademark of serving as a ‘representation or 
designation’ of source under 43(a).  As a result, the first user of an arbitrary 
package, like the first user of an arbitrary word, should be entitled to the pre-
sumption that his package represents him without having to show that it does so 
in fact. 
505 U.S. at 787 (citing AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1536 (“[S]quare size, bright coloring, pebbled 
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In Two Pesos,286 the Court considered the trade dress of restau-
rants, and stopped just short of expressly ruling on whether Aber-
crombie classifications should apply to all trade dress cases; but 
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits agree 
that they do.287 
1. The Seabrook Test—Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, 1977 
The Seabrook test, based on the Abercrombie classifications,288 
was developed in 1977 by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.289  In Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.,290 the 
court enunciated a test for inherent distinctiveness, based on such 
factors as commonality of shape, ornamentation, and distinctive-
ness from accompanying descriptions.291 
In Seabrook, a frozen vegetable package “leaf” design was not 
deemed to be an “unmistakable, certain, distinct” means of identi-
fying “Seabrook Farms.”  Instead, the court decided that the design 
was a decorative panel that served as background for the word por-
tion of the trademark. Bar-Well Foods was able to prove that Sea-
 
texture, polar bear and sunburst images” of the package of the “Klondike” ice cream bar 
held inherently distinctive), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, 16. (1995). 
286. 505 U.S. at 787. 
287. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 1996); Pad-
dington, 996 F.2d at 577, 583; Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1113 (5th Cir. 1991); Blau 
Plumbing Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986); AmBrit, Inc. v. 
Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986). 
288. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
289. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977); 
see also Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857-58 (11th Cir. 
1983); Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of Carolinas, Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1743, 1745 
(N.D. Ga. 1991). 
290. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
291. The Seabrook test includes the following factors: 
Whether [the trade dress] is a “common” basic shape or design, whether it was 
unique or unusual in a particular field, and whether it was a mere refinement of 
a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular 
class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods, 
or whether it was capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the 
accompanying words. 
Seabrook, 568 F.2d. at 1344. 
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brook’s design was not uncommon in the frozen food market.292 
The Seabrook test is very useful because it clarifies the impor-
tance of market context.  The Seabrook test asks “whether the de-
sign, shape or combination of elements is so unique, unusual or 
unexpected in this market that one can assume without proof that it 
will automatically be perceived by customers as an indici[um] of 
origin.”293  Any test of inherent distinctiveness must ask, “Inher-
ently distinctive as compared to what?”294  The Fifth Circuit im-
plicitly asked a similar question in Two Pesos when it considered 
whether, within the universe of Mexican restaurant chains, the 
plaintiff’s particular restaurant decor was common or uncom-
mon.295 
Similarly, the court in Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of 
Carolinas, Inc.,296 relying on the Seabrook test, held that plaintiff’s 
trade dress for a swimming pool clarifier was inherently distinc-
tive.  Specifically, the court stated that “the combination of the 
transparent bottle, dark blue liquid, white cap and layout of the 
white printing carry a distinctive visual impression.”297  In con-
trast, the court in Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp.,298 em-
ploying both the Seabrook and Chevron tests,299 found that the 
 
292. See id. 
293. Krueger Int’l. Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
see Philip Morris, Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  In 
Philip Morris, the court reasoned that: 
This trade dress is inherently distinctive.  Philip Morris says without contradic-
tion that no cigarette manufacturer had evoked the image of the American West 
for the purpose of selling a particular brand until the Marlboro Man saddled up 
and rode into Marlboro Country.  The juxtaposition of product and setting is 
entirely arbitrary, perhaps even fanciful.  Accordingly the Marlboro trade dress 
is protectable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without (under the Two 
Pesos holding) any showing of secondary meaning. 
Id. at 383 (emphasis added); see also Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 
1986) (applying Seabrook test to product design), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
294. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
295. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F.2d 1113, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 
1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
296. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1743 (N.D. Ga. 1991). 
297. Id. at 1745. 
298. 781 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
299. See id. at 1318; see also Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1342, discussed supra Part 
II.B.1; Chevron, 659 F.2d at 695, discussed infra Part II.B.3. 
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plaintiff’s combination of packaging elements for its car polish 
product was not sufficient to establish an inherently distinctive 
trade dress.  According to the court in Turtle Wax, plaintiff’s trade 
dress was merely a combination and refinement of elements al-
ready found in abundance in the field of automotive chemicals, 
even though other products of a similar nature did not possess all 
of the elements of plaintiff’s combination.300  Seabrook highlights 
the notion that a design cannot be considered in a vacuum.301 
2. The AmBrit Test—Eleventh Circuit, 1986 
An often cited Eleventh Circuit case, AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, 
Inc.302 applied the Seabrook test, and evaluated the distinctiveness 
of Klondike ice cream bars in terms of (1) whether the shape or de-
sign was common, (2) whether it was unique in a particular field, 
and (3) whether it was a mere refinement of the well-known form 
of ornamentation for a particular class of goods.303  The purpose of 
this inquiry was to withhold protection of common forms of pres-
entation in a particular field of competition.304 
 
300. Turtle Wax, 781 F. Supp. at 1321.  The court reasoned that: 
Although he found the individual elements of plaintiff’s trade dress to be com-
monplace in the industry, the Magistrate Judge did note that no product pos-
sessed those same elements in combination . . . .  According to Turtle Wax, this 
finding compelled the conclusion that Liquid Crystal’s trade dress was new and 
unique.  However, such a rule essentially would extend trade dress protection to 
every new compilation of elements in a particular field and would run afoul of 
the Seabrook tenet that a trade dress is not unique and distinctive if it merely 
refines common forms of ornamentation utilized in a particular field of 
goods . . . .  Any other rule essentially would require a finding of inherent dis-
tinctiveness whenever a new product enter the market. 
Id. (holding Liquid Crystal trade dress not inherently distinctive) (relying on Seabrook 
and Chevron, discussed supra Part II.B.1 and infra Part II.B.3). 
301. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 
1985) (examining Sportscreme and Sportsgel alleged trademarks, the court held “the de-
termination whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive cannot be made in a vacuum”). 
302. 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
303. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing 
test first established in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 
1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
304. See Turtle Wax, 781 F. Supp. at 1321, in which the court stated: 
Presumably it can be said about the trade dress of any new product that no 
competitive product combines precisely the same elements in its trade dress.  
However, that fact alone does not make the product’s trade dress inherently dis-
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In AmBrit, Kraft’s ice cream Polar B’ar infringed on AmBrit’s 
inherently distinctive trade dress for the Klondike Bar.  Both pack-
ages featured a polar bear and an arctic sun, and Klondike’s pack-
age was held to be arbitrary, thus inherently distinctive.305  The 
court also ruled that the colors used on Klondike’s packaging were 
inherently distinctive.306 
Relying on AmBrit, the court in Callaway Golf Company v. 
Golf Clean, Inc.307 found that the trade dress of Callaway’s “Big 
Bertha” golf clubs was inherently distinctive.308  The court ruled 
that the trade dress incorporated the common, basic shape and de-
sign of golf clubs, but that features such as “chunky” and “aggres-
sive” wide top line, semicircular relief facet on the sole of the club, 
large straight cut rear cavity, distinguishing white score lines, and 
unique medallion in cavity’s insert created a unique total image for 
the clubs.309  The court said that “the record reveals no prior use of 
any combination of the [plaintiff’s] trade dress elements that is at 
all similar to the unique impression conveyed by [their] trade 
dress.”310  Callaway’s arbitrary combination of features makes 
their Big Bertha Irons inherently distinctive.311 
3. The Chevron Test—Fifth Circuit, 1981 
In Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 
Inc.,312 the Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s gardening 
and lawn bottles packaging were inherently distinctive, noting that 
“the possible varieties of advertising display and packaging are vir-
tually endless.”313  Under the Chevron test, a trade dress may be 
 
tinctive.  Any other rule essentially would require a finding of inherent distinct-
iveness whenever a new product enters the market. 
Id. 
305. For an in-depth discussion of Ambrit, see supra Part I.B. 
306. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1536. 
307. 915 F. Supp. 1206 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding Big Bertha golf clubs are inher-
ently distinctive). 
308. Id. at 1212. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 1212 (quoting AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537). 
311. Id. 
312. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). 
313. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 659, 703 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). 
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protected notwithstanding an absence of secondary meaning “[i]f 
the features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary 
and serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its 
effective packaging.”314  This language echoes the standards set 
forth in Abercrombie & Fitch.315 The Supreme Court explicitly ap-
proved the application of the Chevron test to product designs in its 
decision in Two Pesos.316 
The Supreme Court noted that the Chevron317 test for inherent 
distinctiveness, or variations of it, is followed by the Fifth, Sev-
enth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.318  Although Chevron does not 
set out each of the individual Abercrombie classifications, the 
Court stated that “[t]he Fifth Circuit was quite right in Chevron . . . 
to follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to in-
quire whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 
43(a) is inherently distinctive.”319 
Most importantly, the Chevron test establishes that rather than 
any one feature, it is “the combination of elements and the total 
impression that the dress gives to the observer that should be the 
focus of a court’s analysis of distinctiveness.”320  “If overall dress 
is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive, it is inherently distinctive de-
spite its incorporation of generic or descriptive elements.”321  The 
court wrote that “[o]ne could no more deny protection to a trade 
dress for using commonly used elements than one could deny pro-
tection to a trademark because it consisted of a combination of 
 
314. Id. at 702.  The court further noted that “[t]he combination of particular hues 
of . . . colors, arranged in certain geometric designs, presented in conjunction with a par-
ticular style of printing . . . create a distinctive visual impression” (regarding packaging 
of lawn and garden products).  Id. at 703. 
315. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976).. 
316. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992). 
317. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 695. 
318. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770. 
319. Id. at 773. 
320. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron, 659 F.2d at 695, 702). 
321. Paddington, 996 F.2d at 584; cf. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 
71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding despite functionality of individual elements of sports bag, 
bag is nonfunctional “when viewed in its entirety”). 
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commonly used letters of the alphabet.”322  Under Chevron, it is in 
the best interest of the potential trade dress owner to choose trade 
dress that would acquire inherently distinct status immediately, 
namely an arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive trade dress. 
4. The Paddington Test—Second Circuit, 1993 
Consistent with most of the post-Two Pesos case law in the 
New York area,323 in Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Dis-
tributors, Inc.,324 the court applied the Seabrook and Chevron ap-
proaches, to determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.  In 
Paddington, an importer of the anise liqueur ouzo under the label 
“No. 12 Ouzo” brought a trademark and trade dress infringement 
suit against a rival ouzo importer using the label “#1 Ouzo.”  The 
importers’ bottle designs, labeling, and gift boxes were “strikingly 
similar” in appearance,325 containing similar design elements and 
“using identical shades of red, white and black.”326  The court of 
appeals concluded that the No. 12 Ouzo bottle was inherently dis-
tinctive.327 
Notably, Paddington marks a departure from the Second Cir-
 
322. Paddington,  996 F.2d at 584 (applying Chevron test). 
323. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Paddington, 996 F.2d at 577; Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear, Inc., 
897 F. Supp. 789, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding in men’s necktie industry “the use of 
geometric design elements, bright colors and the like is common”); Casa Editrice 
Bonechi, S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 1995 WL 528001 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ap-
plying Seabrook test to souvenir guidebooks); Jaret Int’l, Inc. v. Promotion In Motion, 
Inc., 826 F. Supp. 69, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying Seabrook test to sour candies); EFS 
Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding no 
trade dress protection for Troll doll with pointed ears, pug nose, pot belly, wild hair and 
outstretched arms, because such elements are common in doll industry). 
324. 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993). 
325. Id. at 586. 
326. Id. 
327. In Paddington, the court ruled that: 
There is nothing descriptive about the bottle and label design that conveys any-
thing about its particular contents, except for the use of the trademark “No. 12 
Ouzo,” and the fact that the bottle . . . indicates to the observer that it contains a 
liquid that probably is potable.  The tone and layout of the colors, the style and 
size of the lettering, and, most important, the overall appearance of the bottle’s 
labeling, are undeniably arbitrary.  They were selected from an almost limitless 
supply of patterns, colors and designs. 
Id. at 584. 
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cuit’s pre-Two Pesos stance that it would not be clear error to find 
that No. 12 ouzo’s trade dress was weak based on lack of secon-
dary meaning.  In Paddington, the Second Circuit followed Two 
Pesos, and ruled that “[b]ased on the record before us, the No. 12 
trade dress clearly is arbitrary and fanciful and would appear to a 
consumer to be intended to identify the origin of the product, and 
therefore it is a strong mark,”328 with no proof of secondary mean-
ing required.329 
Following Paddington, the court in Kompan, A.S. v. Park 
Structures, Inc.330 found a playground equipment manufacturer’s 
trade dress likely to be inherently distinctive.  The court stressed 
that even if each of the design elements in a product’s trade dress 
would not be inherently distinctive on its own, the court must look 
at the combination of elements and the total impression it gives the 
observer in order to determine whether the trade dress is distinc-
tive.331 
Thus, according to Kompan, because producers have almost 
unlimited choice in design, trade dress choices will normally be 
inherently distinctive.332  If, however, a particular industry custom-
arily uses certain trade dress, then trade dress is generic rather that 
 
328. Id. at 585; see Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 
832 F.2d 1317, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Opium” perfume’s trademark and trade dress are 
arbitrary rather than generic or descriptive and thus are among the strongest and most 
highly protected class of trademarks”); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 
(11th Cir. 1986) (in analyzing the strength of trade dress, “the scope of protection in-
creases as the trade dress moves toward the arbitrary end of the spectrum”), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
329. See Paddington, 996 F.2d at 585. 
330. 890 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
331. In Kompan, the court stated that: 
Although other manufacturers sometimes used curved lines, they neither use 
them as consistently as Kompan nor emphasize the curves as design elements 
in the way that Kompan does.  In addition, Kompan uses color in a way not 
replicated by the other manufacturers.  Other manufacturers also use the pri-
mary colors, red, blue, and yellow, emphasized in Kompan’s designs, but none 
do so as predominantly or in the same combinations of shades and hues.  A po-
tential consumer familiar with Kompan’s use of color might well recognize a 
Kompan product by its color combinations alone. 
Id. at 1174 (citing Paddington, 996 F.2d at 584). 
332. See id. at 1173. 
SHPETNER.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1998] TEST FOR INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS IN TRADE DRESS 993 
distinctive and is not entitled to protection.333 
C. Product Configuration Cases 
Trade dress is sometimes broken into two camps: product con-
figuration and package design.  Product configuration cases deal 
with the shape of the product itself, unlike package design cases, 
which concern the overall packaging appearance of a product.334  
This section isolates product configuration cases, and articulates 
the various tests used to determine inherent distinctiveness in trade 
dress. Courts employ a variety of dissimilar tests, none of which 
are identical. 
For example, the Second and Third Circuits have adopted 
strict, but differing, standards for finding inherent distinctiveness 
in product configuration cases, and have rejected the Abercrombie 
classifications335 as a workable standard. 
In Duraco Products, Inc., v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd.,336 the 
Third Circuit fashioned its own test requiring product configura-
tion trade dress to be “unusual and memorable;” “conceptually 
separable from the product;” and “likely to serve primarily as a 
designator of origin of the product.”337  In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lolly-
togs Ltd.,338 the Second Circuit created its own test for inherent 
distinctiveness involving the manufacturers’ “intent” to use the 
product’s shape to distinguish his goods. 
Other courts are split as to whether Knitwaves’ and Duraco’s 
 
333. See id. at 1173; see also Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 
F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1995) (“‘Trade dress’ has taken on a more expansive meaning and 
includes the design and appearance of the product as well as that of the container and all 
elements making up the total visual image by which the product is presented to custom-
ers.”); cf. Fabrication Enters. v. Hygienic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1995); Mulberry 
Thai Silks, Inc. v. K&K Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refus-
ing to protect a particular trade dress because its overall design was common to all prod-
ucts within its industry); Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 
1068-69 (7th Cir. 1992). 
334. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1434. 
335. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976); discussion supra Part I.A. 
336. 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
337. Id. 
338. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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strict standards should apply in lieu of the Abercrombie classifica-
tions339 to product configuration and/or package design cases.340  
This section will discuss the various approaches courts take when 
determining the inherent distinctiveness of a product’s configura-
tion. 
1. The Knitwaves Test—Second Circuit, 1995 
In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.,341 the Second Circuit an-
nounced a departure from its earlier approach to trade dress law.342  
Knitwaves involved the design of children’s sweaters, particularly 
the use of “leaf” and “squirrel” designs placed on the sweaters.343  
The court stated that the Abercrombie classifications did not make 
sense when applied to product features, and were therefore inappli-
cable to product designs.344 The court created a new test for inher-
ent distinctiveness to determine whether the manufacturer “used” 
or “intended to use” the design to “identify the source and distin-
guish his or her goods.”345  In fashioning its “intent” requirement, 
the Knitwaves court relied on dicta from the Supreme Court’s 1995 
opinion in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.346  Qualitex ad-
dressed the issue of whether a color could serve as a registered 
trademark.347  Upon determining that a color could not be inher-
 
339. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 4. 
340. See Newberg, supra note 19; Stewart & Huget, supra note 43. 
341. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
342. See id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 1006-1009. 
345. Id. 
346. 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
347. As a matter of policy, color alone is not protected as trade dress, unless it has 
acquired secondary meaning.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
162 (1995) (holding that a single color is entitled to registration and protection); Norwich 
Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding color 
will not be protected where it is functional; pink is functional for stomach medicine be-
cause it creates a pleasing effect for Pepto-Bismol stomach medicine), cert. denied, 362 
U.S. 919 (1960); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir 1985) 
(holding that pink is not functional for insulation); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull 
Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that black is functional for out-
board motors because compatible with other boat colors), reh’g denied, 1994 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30952 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); R.L. Winston Rod 
Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Mont. 1993) (all shades of green are 
functional for graphite fishing rods because only a limited number of dye colors are 
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ently distinctive,348 the Court conceded that a color could acquire 
secondary meaning because “over time, customers may come to 
treat a particular color . . . as signifying a brand.”349  The Court 
concluded that the green-gold color of an ironing board cover at 
issue in Qualitex, although not inherently distinctive, had acquired 
secondary meaning and therefore could be registered as a trade-
mark.350 
Notably, Qualitex was a trademark case that hinged entirely on 
secondary meaning.  According to the Supreme Court in Two Pe-
sos, secondary meaning is not a factor used to determine inherent 
distinctiveness in trade dress.351  Detractors of the Knitwaves opin-
ion note its reliance on Qualitex, rather than Two Pesos, and the re-
sulting requirement of proving secondary meaning to establish a 
piece of clothing’s inherent distinctiveness.352 
2. The Stuart Hall Test—Eighth Circuit, 1995 
The court in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp.,353 per Two Pe-
sos,354 correctly separated the issues of inherent distinctiveness and 
secondary meaning when determining an overall finding of inher-
ent distinctiveness in trade dress.  Stuart Hall involved notebook 
designs.355  Specifically, the court held that the layout and packag-
ing of Stuart Hall’s notepad was protected from being copied by 
Ampad because it was inherently distinctive not to consumers, but 
in and of the type of product itself.356 
Contrary to the Second Circuit’s Knitwaves ruling, the Eighth 
Circuit, in Stuart Hall,357 made a forceful and persuasive argument 
that “the Supreme Court has not authorized us to abandon Aber-
 
available due to difficulties in the dye process). 
348. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
349. Id. at 162. 
350. Id. at 162 (finding green-gold dry-cleaning press pads subject to trademark 
protection). 
351. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
352. See Kane, supra note 40. 
353. 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995). 
354. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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crombie,” no matter how much difficulty it causes.358  The Eighth 
Circuit reasoned that Two Pesos was clearly a case of product de-
sign and that court expressly approved the application of the Aber-
crombie classifications to the design of a Mexican restaurant 
chain.359  Moreover, the court in Stuart Hall found that the entire 
thrust of Two Pesos was to unify the standards for trademark and 
trade dress, not to balkanize this complex field into yet more sub-
categories.360 
This Eighth Circuit approach resembled the Fifth Circuit’s ap-
proach in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing 
Groups,361 and emphasized the issue of functionality.362  The ques-
tion presented by the Eighth Circuit, therefore, is whether and how 
much the trade dress is dictated by the nature of the product, not 
whether consumers remember or are “struck by”363 the design, or 
associate the design with its source.364 
3. The Krueger Test—Southern District of New York, 
1996 
In the 1996 Krueger Int’l., Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., decision,365 
the district court departed from the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Knitwaves366 and agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion in 
Stuart Hall367 that the Supreme Court envisions trade dress as a 
“single concept” with trademark law requiring a single test for in-
 
358. Id. at 788. 
359. See id. 
360. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602 (discussing Stuart Hall). 
361. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding gardening and lawn care bottles and 
packaging inherently distinctive), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); see discussion su-
pra Part II.B.3. 
362. Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 786.  The question asked by the court was: 
[W]hether, and how much, the trade dress is dictated by the nature of the prod-
uct . . . . If the specific design of the trade dress is only tenuously connected 
with the nature of the product, then it is inherently distinctive . . . . If the design 
of the trade dress is dictated by the nature of the product, then secondary mean-
ing must be proven. 
Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
365. 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
366. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); see discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
367. 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995); see discussion supra Parts II.C.2, III.B. 
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herent distinctiveness.368  In Krueger, the court ruled that the over-
all look of Krueger’s Matrix chair was inherently distinctive and 
was protectable trade dress.369  Further, the court prohibited Night-
ingale from producing an exact copy of Krueger’s Matrix chair.370  
The court stated that the 1995 Knitwaves decision positing a new 
test for inherent distinctiveness “confuse[d] the analytical require-
ments for inherent distinctiveness with those of secondary mean-
ing.”371 
The Krueger court went on to state that “inherent distinctive-
ness cannot hinge on how a producer intends to promote a de-
sign.”372  If such were the case, the evidentiary requirements for 
inherent distinctiveness “would be almost identical to those for 
secondary meaning, and there would be no point in having two 
categories.”373  The Krueger court explained that a producer of a 
product could only prove “intent” by presenting evidence of how 
he or she had advertised (or positioned) the product, and by intro-
ducing consumer surveys showing how well the advertising 
worked.374  This is the kind of evidence typically required for a 
showing of secondary meaning, not inherent distinctiveness.375  
“An inherent quality, by contrast, is one which ‘inheres’ in a prod-
uct, regardless of what the producer intends, particularly if the 
product is too new to have acquired secondary meaning.”376  The 
Supreme Court Two Pesos decision did not create an “intent” re-
quirement, and stated only that an inherently distinctive design is 
one that is “capable of identifying a particular source of the prod-
uct.”377 
Furthermore, the Krueger court noted that the Supreme Court 
 
368. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602. 
369. Id. at 607. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 602. 
372. Id. at 602. 
373. Id. 
374. See id. 
375. See id. (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 
(1982)) (“To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds 
of the public, the primary significance of a product feature . . . is to identify the source of 
the product rather than the product itself.”). 
376. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602 (citing Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769). 
377. Id. 
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explicitly cautioned that attaching a requirement of secondary 
meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress onto section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act would “undermine the purposes of the Lanham 
Act.”378  Essentially, the Krueger test focuses on the preservation 
of healthy competition and protects designs that are “pleasing” as 
long as they are not merely “basic elements of a style” and thus 
part of the public domain.379 
4. The Duraco Test—Third Circuit, 1994 
In Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd.,380 the 
court held that a plastic Greek urn manufactured by Duraco was 
not inherently distinctive because there was no evidence that con-
sumers associated the faux marble plastic urn with the Duraco 
source name.381  In the wake of Two Pesos, which overruled the 
Third Circuit’s previous requirement that trade dress must always 
have secondary meaning to be protected, the Duraco court crafted 
a new test for inherent distinctiveness.  Rejecting the Abercrombie 
test as inappropriate for product configuration, the Third Circuit 
held that unfair competition law did not preclude others from copy-
ing trade dress unless the trade dress represented to consumers the 
source of the goods.382  The court stated that in order to be inher-
ently distinctive, a product’s feature383 or combination or arrange-
ment of features, or a product’s configuration, namely the product 
itself,384 or the product’s packaging, must be (1) unusual and 
memorable;385 (2) conceptually separable from the product;386 and 
 
378. Id. (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774); see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
379. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 606 (quoting Wallace, 916 F.2d at 81). 
380. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). 
381. See id. 
382. Id. at 1442-1448. 
383. An example of a product’s “feature” is the color pink used by Pepto Bismol.  
See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959). 
384. See Klein, supra note 239, at 85 (“Product configurations, as a class, are less 
likely to indicate their source to consumers and therefore, even if inherently distinctive, 
would be protectable only on proof of secondary meaning.”). 
385. The definition of unusual and memorable trade dress is that “[i]t must partake 
of a unique, individualized appearance, so that a consumer informed of all the options 
available in the market could reasonably rely on it to identify a source.”  Duraco, 40 F.3d 
at 1449; see Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Hoffman, supra note 31, at 222 (asserting trade dress is inherently distinctive only if “so 
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(3) likely to serve primarily as designator of origin of the prod-
uct.387  This three-part test thus requires that the trade dress must 
serve a source-identifying function in order to receive trade dress 
protection.388  Moreover, unless the trade dress is “memorable, that 
is, striking or unusual in appearance, or is prominently displayed 
on the product packaging, or otherwise somehow apt to be im-
pressed upon the minds of consumers so that it is likely to be actu-
ally and distinctly remembered,” it cannot serve as a designator of 
origin.389  No other circuit has yet to adopt this test,390 and many 
have explicitly rejected it.391 
In Duraco, a strikingly similar faux-marble urn of compara-
 
unique . . . in a particular market, that one can assume, without proof, that it will auto-
matically be perceived by customer[s] as an indicia [sic] of origin—a trademark”) (citing 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:1, at 4 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 
1988), and AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). 
386. To be conceptually separable, the product configuration must be recognizable 
by the consumer “as an indicium of source, rather than a decorative symbol or pattern.” 
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449 (quoting Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471, 1994 WL 228939 
at *4, rev’d, 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
387. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1450 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
388. See id. at 1451. 
389. Id. at 1449; see also Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1468, 
1470, 1994 WL 228939 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“The trade dress must be remembered before 
it can be confusing”), rev’d, 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1536 
(setting forth criterion to measure distinctiveness); Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1069 
(holding that sales brochures are inherently distinctive if consumers can identify the 
product from the trade dress and the trade dress is arbitrary or suggestive); see also Pad-
dington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1993). 
390. But see Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshko, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
discussion infra Part II.C.5. 
391. See, e.g., Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).  The 
court stated that: 
We read Two Pesos as resting on a presumption that “trade dress” is a single 
concept that encompasses both product configuration and packaging, and find 
that its holding applies to trade dress as a whole, not merely to packaging.  Two 
Pesos concerned the trade dress of a Mexican restaurant . . . .  The Duraco 
opinion views a restaurant’s decor as more like packaging than product con-
figuration, and finds that therefore Two Pesos bears no implications regarding 
product configuration.  We perceive a restaurant’s decor as being as akin to 
product configuration as to packaging . . . . [P]roduct configuration, like pack-
aging, can be inherently distinctive, and if it is, no showing of secondary mean-
ing is required. 
Id. at 788 (citations omitted). 
SHPETNER.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1000 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:947 
tively poorer quality was allowed by the district court to continue 
competing with the Duraco urn, because “there is no evidence that 
consumers, whether K-Mart buyers or retail customers, perceived 
that the product emanates from a single source, or for that matter, 
that the public identified the Duraco planter with the Duraco 
name.”392  The court stated that buyers were motivated by profit 
margin, and the public was motivated by buying an inexpensive 
“impulse item.”393  The Duraco court stated that protectable trade 
dress must not appear to the consumer to be a mere component, or 
essence, of product gestalt.394  Rather, it must appear to be a “red 
flag” indicator of the product source.395  Therefore, uniqueness of 
product configuration is not enough by itself to make configuration 
inherently distinctive, as required for trade dress protection.396 
5. The Sassafras Test—Northern District of Illinois, 1996 
The only other case endorsing the “unusual and memorable”397 
source-identifying capabilities of inherently distinctive trade dress 
 
392. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1437. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. at 1449; see Dillon, supra note 60, at 85 (defining protectable trade dress as 
“a combination of elements selected to identify origin, rather than to serve as mere de-
cor”). 
395. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1450.  The court facetiously crowned its comparison with 
the adapted aphorism, “[a]n urn is an urn is an urn.”  Id. at 1437 n.3; cf. Gertrude Stein, 
Sacred Emily (1913) (“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”), in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 
178, 187 (1922).  The configuration of the Grecian-style faux-marble plastic planter was 
not inherently distinctive, because consumers were likely to appreciate the planter’s de-
sign as an attractive aspect of the product, but not as a source-indicator (i.e. the Duraco 
planter). 
396. The court in Duraco explicitly rejects transplanting the categorical distinctive-
ness inquiry developed for trademarks, see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), to product configurations, where alleged trade dress 
can lie in the very product itself.  See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440.  Note that the Duraco de-
cision deals exclusively with trade dress said to inhere in the product itself, rather than 
trade dress alleged in a product’s packaging.  These two very different situations will ar-
guably diverge in various incidents.  This Note attempts to discuss the dicta in Duraco, 
which is not product configuration-exclusive in order to give a more relevant assessment 
of various tests for inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.  In Two Pesos the Supreme 
Court specifically stated that the sole issue before the court was whether secondary mean-
ing must be proven for an inherently distinctive trade dress vel non.  Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 
at 767, n.6. 
397. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440. 
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set out in Duraco is a recent case within the Eighth Circuit, Sassa-
fras Enterprises, Inc. v. Roshko, Inc.398  The case involved a house-
hold appliance, specifically a pizza baking system and the accom-
panying recipe book.399  The pizza oven was not found to be 
inherently distinctive.400  Following Duraco, the court stated that, 
as with trademarks, a product’s appearance is entitled to trade 
dress protection only if the appearance signifies the product’s 
source.401  The Sassafras court held that competitors are free to 
copy a product’s configuration down to the minutest detail, no 
matter how unique or original that product may be.402  It is interest-
ing to note that the Illinois Sassafras court did not follow the estab-
lished Eighth Circuit Stuart Hall case403 decided one year prior to 
Sassafras. 
III. THE PROPOSED NATIONAL TEST 
There are many different tests currently being used to deter-
mine inherently distinctive trade dress.  This is troubling because 
proving inherent distinctiveness is crucial to protecting one’s prod-
uct or service from being illegally duplicated by copycats.404  
While the Supreme Court and the legislature have required a find-
ing of inherent distinctiveness to protect trade dress, neither has 
defined precisely what inherent distinctiveness means.405  Thus, 
courts have had to invent their own various definitions of the term 
over the years, and now disparity and incongruity abound.406  A 
clear, nationally accepted test to determine inherent distinctiveness 
in trade dress is needed to stop contradictory rulings from being 
made across the country, and to protect trade dress owners’ rights 
 
398. 915 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (pizza stoneware set and instruction book not 
inherently distinctive). 
399. Id. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. 
402. Id. 
403. 51 F.3d 780; see discussion supra Part II.C.2; discussion infra Part III.B. 
404. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763 (1992). 
405. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763 (1992). 
406. See Gaske, supra note 41, at 1137; cf. Brown, supra note 41, at 1378-79; John-
son, supra note 41, at 285-86. 
SHPETNER.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1002 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:947 
in some kind of consistent, reliable fashion. 
By combining the best elements of various circuit court tests 
for determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress, this part de-
velops a test that can be implemented in all trade dress cases—
encompassing both product configuration and package design 
alike, and everything in between. 
The proposed test is very similar to the test posited by the court 
in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp.,407 because this proposed test 
relies on many of the same underlying cases.  The new test devised 
in this part adds new definitions to the steps that the Stuart Hall 
appellate court took to arrive at its finding that Stuart Hall’s note-
pad design was inherently distinctive.  These new definitions are 
culled from other case law to clarify particular concepts so as to 
eliminate any source of confusion as to the meanings of terms such 
as “unique.” 
Section A sets forth the various tests currently employed by 
courts nationwide, and the ensuing confusion.  Section B discusses 
both the overruled and current Stuart Hall408 decisions, treating the 
decisions as a “case study” to illustrate the controversy resulting 
from the Supreme Court’s 1992 Two Pesos decision.  Section C 
sets forth the specific prongs of this Note’s proposed national test, 
and explains why each element is important to determining inher-
ent distinctiveness in trade dress. 
A. Confusion Among Courts 
Tests for determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress 
remain ambiguous in the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits.  In 
these circuits, the rules for trade dress protection were upended in 
1992 by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc.409  Prior to Two Pesos, a plaintiff seeking trade dress 
protection in these circuits had to prove that the dress had acquired 
secondary meaning.410  Two Pesos held that protection for trade 
 
407. 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995). 
408. Id. 
409. 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see supra Part I.F (discussing the Two Pesos ruling). 
410. See Health o Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 
1995) (holding split-mat scale design inherently distinctive) (citing Two Pesos, discussed 
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dress requires either inherent distinctiveness or secondary mean-
ing, but not both.411 
The absence of a dispositive gauge for determining inherent 
distinctiveness has resulted in Circuit courts, and even district 
courts within the same jurisdiction, using dissimilar measurements 
and factors to determine whether trade dress is inherently distinc-
tive.412  In some cases, the court’s test for inherent distinctiveness 
requires that the trade dress be so unique that consumers will 
automatically associate the product with a particular source.413  In 
other cases, consumer awareness does not come into play and the 
dispute is over precisely how the trade dress describes or relates to 
the product itself.414 
For example, in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc.,415 the Second Circuit  introduced a classification system for 
determining distinctiveness that focused solely on the connection 
between the trade dress and the product, not the trade dress and the 
consumer.416  In contrast, in Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic 
Enters.,417 the Third Circuit used a test for determining distinctive-
ness that focused singularly on the connection between the trade 
dress and the consumer, and ignored the Abercrombie & Fitch 
 
supra Part I.F, and relying on the Chevron test, discussed supra Part II.B.3). 
411. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770-71. 
412. The crux of the problem is that a “distinctive” trade dress, that is, trade dress 
that is different or the first of its kind, might or might not be “inherently distinctive.”  See 
supra Part II (analyzing various tests used to determine inherent distinctiveness in trade 
dress); see also John B. Hardaway III, Jeffrey L. Wilson, & J. Bennett Mullinax, Trade 
Dress Protection, 4-DEC S.C. LAW. 14 (1992). 
413. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 
1994) (holding that a plastic Greek urn manufactured by Duraco was not inherently dis-
tinctive, because there was no evidence that consumers associated the faux marble plastic 
urn with the Duraco source name); see also supra Part II.C.4 (discussing Duraco). 
414. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
the layout and packaging of a notepad was protected from being copied by a competitor 
because it was inherently distinctive not to consumers, but in and of the type of product 
itself); see also Krueger Int’l, Inc., v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (stating that an ‘inherent’ quality is one which ‘inheres’ in a product, regardless of 
whether the producer of the product intends the product to identify its source). 
415. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
416. See supra Part I.A (discussing the test for inherent distinctiveness set forth in 
Abercrombie). 
417. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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classification system.418  Employing yet another test in Knitwaves, 
Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd.,419 the Second Circuit recently focused on 
the consumer-trade dress connection, but went one step further and 
brought in the issue of the manufacturer’s intent to use the design 
of the trade dress to indicate the source of his or her product.420  
Then a few months later in Kreuger International, Inc. v. Nightin-
gale, Inc.,421 the Second Circuit changed its tune and focused in-
stead on the availability of alternative designs and the overall ap-
pearance of the combination of elements. Alternatively, in Chevron 
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,422 the Fifth 
Circuit did not require proof of source identification to show that 
trade dress is inherently distinctive and, like Abercrombie, the fo-
cus was on the arbitrariness of the trade dress and its relevance to 
the product.423  Yet another test, applied in  Seabrook,424 also 
sometimes referred to as the AmBrit425 test, focuses on a compari-
son of a plaintiff’s trade dress to others in the same class of goods, 
not on the trade dress’s impact on consumers.426 
B. A Case Study 
The potential exists for tests for inherent distinctiveness to be 
devised and enacted contrary to established law.  The evolution of 
the Eighth Circuit Stuart Hall case is an excellent case study.  Be-
fore being overruled, the district court’s decision in Stuart Hall427 
demonstrated that in the absence of a nationwide standard, courts 
 
418. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the test for inherent distinctiveness set forth 
in Duraco). 
419. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
420. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the test for inherent distinctiveness set forth 
in Knitwaves). 
421. 915 F. Supp. 595 (2d Cir. 1996); see discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
422. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). 
423. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the test for inherent distinctiveness set forth 
in Chevron). 
424. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 
1977). 
425. See Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc. 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
426. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3 (discussing the tests for inherent distinctiveness 
set forth in Seabrook and AmBrit). 
427. 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1468, 1470, (1994) WL 228939 (W.D. Mo. 1994), 
rev’d 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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can broadly, and incorrectly, interpret the Supreme Court’s ruling 
regarding inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.428 
In 1994, the Stuart Hall district court rejected the widely used 
Chevron test429 and put a new twist on the difficult issue of defin-
ing an “inherently distinctive” trade dress by requiring a “striking” 
appearance.430  The trade dress at issue in this case consisted of 
various features of note pads, including their tear-off covers, per-
manent covers, and inside page layouts.  The court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that its 
trade dress was “eminently forgettable rather than memorable.”431  
Although there was evidence that the defendant copied every detail 
of the layout of the plaintiff’s inside page, the court found that the 
plaintiff’s layout was extremely weak in its mental impact and had 
a routine appearance.432  Thus, the court found that the page layout 
was not “intentionally designed to identify the source of the prod-
uct,” but rather simply “to supply a practical, nice-appearing inside 
page.”433 
The court acknowledged that other courts have seldom, if ever, 
used the terminology “striking” or “memorable” in defining an in-
herently distinctive trade dress.434  However, the court noted that 
this definition was consistent with the requirement that a protect-
able mark or trade dress be “recognizable as an indicium of source, 
rather than a decorative symbol or pattern.”435  The court reasoned, 
“[t]o surpass merely decorative or aesthetically pleasing features 
 
428. Id.; see also supra Part I.F (discussing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
505 U.S. 763 (1992)). 
429. See Chevron, 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed supra Part II.B.3. 
430. In Stuart Hall, the court required that: 
In order to be inherently distinctive in a manner to serve as a source-identifier, 
it seems evident that a trade dress must have sufficient strength of visual impact 
to impress itself on the mind of the consumer, and thus be subject to recall 
when the consumer next enters the market.  The trade dress must thus be strik-
ing in appearance, or at least memorable. 
Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1470 (emphasis added). 
431. Id. 
432. See id. 
433. Id. (emphasis added); see also William G. Barber, Recent Developments in 
Trademark Law, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47 (1994). 
434. See Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1470. 
435. Id. at 1471 (citing 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18.01, at 2 (4th ed. 
1988)). 
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and become a source identifier, a trade dress must be striking and 
memorable.”436  In a footnote, the judge offered the following as 
appearances he personally finds striking and memorable: “Du-
rante’s nose, Holmes’ mustache, Chief Judge Arnold’s bow ties 
and Congressman Leach’s sweaters.”437 
Citing Abercrombie,438 Chevron,439 and Seabrook,440 the appel-
late court held that “the classification of trade dress as arbitrary or 
fanciful or suggestive, and thus inherently distinctive, requires no 
showing that the trade dress is memorable or striking.”441  The 
Eighth Circuit had consistently applied Abercrombie442 in the past, 
and in light of Two Pesos’ approval,443 “[saw] no reason to aban-
don the classic test now.”444  The court found that the district court 
erred as a matter of law by requiring that Stuart Hall’s trade dress 
be striking, or at least memorable, to be inherently distinctive.445  
The “striking and memorable” requirement was found to be incon-
sistent with the established law of the Eighth Circuit, the majority 
of other circuits, and the Supreme Court, so the court confirmed its 
adherence to the Abercrombie test for inherent distinctiveness of 
trade dress.446 
C. The Proposed Test 
The sheer number and variety of differing tests and criteria 
used to determine inherent distinctiveness in trade dress clearly 
mandates the need for a national, uniform approach to this issue.  
Accordingly, this Note proposes an efficient three-pronged ap-
proach combining the best elements of the Abercrombie categori-
 
436. Id. at 1471. 
437. Id. at 1470, n.1. 
438. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976); 
see discussion supra Part I.A. 
439. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); see discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
440. Seabrook Foods, Inc., v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977); 
see discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
441. Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 788. 
442. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
443. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
444. 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995). 
445. Id. at 788. 
446. Id. 
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zation system,447 the Seabrook test,448 the AmBrit test,449 and the 
Chevron test.450 
Importantly, the proposed test specifically defines inherent dis-
tinctiveness in trade dress.  The test argues that there is no reason 
to require a plaintiff to show consumer connotations associated 
with inherently distinctive trade dress, because buyer association 
with a product is solely a question of secondary meaning, not in-
herent distinctiveness.451  The proper question is how much the 
trade dress is dictated by the nature of the product, good, or ser-
vice, and whether it is capable of indicating the product’s source, 
not whether consumers remember or are struck by the design, or 
whether consumers associate the design with its source.452  Again, 
this latter question is one of secondary meaning, not inherent dis-
tinctiveness. 
The proposed test prevents the unfair competition that would 
result from the copying of an unusual or unique package design or 
product configuration when secondary meaning cannot be proven.  
However, failure to satisfy all three prongs of the proposed test 
will necessitate proof of secondary meaning in order to receive 
protection from trade dress infringement. 
The proposed test provides three prongs that must be satisfied 
for trade dress to be deemed inherently distinctive.  First, it is nec-
essary to determine whether the design or shape or combination of 
elements is common or basic.  If ordinary, everyday designs are 
pervasively used in commerce, those designs may not be protected 
as being inherently distinctive of a particular product or source.  
The Lanham Act specifically provides protection only to trade 
dress that is capable of distinguishing a product and its source from 
similar products.453 
 
447. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976); see supra Part I.A. 
448. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see supra Part II.B.1. 
449. 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see supra 
Part II.B.2. 
450. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); see supra 
Part II.B.3. 
451. See id.; supra Part I.E. 
452. Ambrit, 812 F.2d at 1531; see supra Part II.B.2. 
453. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); see supra Part I.D.  As illustrated in AmBrit, an 
ice cream package featuring the random, arbitrary combination of textured silver foil, a 
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At this point, the second prong of the proposed test becomes 
important: whether the total impression that the design or shape 
gives to the observer is unique, unusual or unexpected in a particu-
lar field.454  There are three important distinctions regarding this 
factor. 
The first distinction is that even if each element alone would 
not be inherently distinctive, the combination of elements can still 
be inherently distinctive.  It is well established that trade dress en-
compasses a product or service’s overall look and total image.455 
The second distinction is that “unique” is to be defined as arbi-
trary, fanciful or suggestive on the Abercrombie scale456 and ap-
plies to the combination of elements and the total impression the 
trade dress gives to the observer.457  Uniqueness plays a large part 
in determining whether a product’s trade dress is inherently dis-
tinctive, and is a difficult standard to satisfy.  For example, orna-
mentation lacks inherent distinctiveness if it is merely a variation 
of decoration commonly used for a type of goods, such as “stripes, 
bars and designs” on athletic shoes.458 
By looking at the overall combination of elements, the pro-
posed test prevents a product’s trade dress from being inherently 
distinctive merely because no competitive product combines pre-
cisely the same elements in its trade dress.  At the same time, a 
particular trade dress can still be considered inherently distinctive, 
meaning arbitrary and different from others in the field, without 
being particularly “striking or memorable”459  The possible varia-
tions of design elements for a package design or product configura-
tion are virtually infinite in the areas of fanciful, arbitrary and sug-
 
polar bear, and a shining sun is inherently distinctive Klondike Ice Cream Bar trade dress.  
812 F.2d 1531; see supra Part II.B.2. 
454. See Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1342; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
455. See supra Part I.F; Chevron, 659 F.2d 695 (stating that the Lanham Act does 
not require proof of secondary meaning when the overall impression of the trade dress is 
distinctive), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); see, e.g., Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763. 
456. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 4; discussion supra Part I.A. 
457. Id. 
458. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 858 n.10 (11th 
Cir. 1983). 
459. Id. 
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gestive trade dress.460  By setting out a clear definition of “unique-
ness,”461 and adhering to established trademark law,462 the pro-
posed test prevents monopolization, and does not improperly ex-
pand trade dress protection into areas reserved for copyrights and 
patents.463 
The third distinction to draw regarding the second prong of the 
proposed test is that isolated third party uses of various elements of 
the plaintiff’s trade dress do not detract from the distinctiveness of 
the overall impression of those elements of the plaintiff’s prod-
uct.464 
The final prong of the proposed test is to determine that the de-
sign or shape or combination of elements is not a mere refinement 
of a commonly adapted and well-known form of ornamentation for 
the goods or services.  According to Paddington,465 which fol-
lowed parts of the tests set forth in Seabrook,466 AmBrit467 and 
Chevron,468 the tone and layout of colors, size, lettering, and style 
can be selected from an almost limitless supply of patterns, colors 
and designs.469  If a particular industry customarily uses certain 
combinations in trade dress then the trade dress is generic rather 
than distinctive, and is not entitled to protection.470 
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Two Pesos, if 
a product is inherently distinctive under the proposed test, secon-
 
460. See Gaske, supra note 41, at 1134 n.97 (“[T]he use of the inherent distinctive-
ness test has been justified in a trade dress case because ‘the wide range of available 
packaging and design options allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity with-
out unduly hindering his competitor’s ability to compete.’”) (quoting Sicilia Di R. Bie-
bow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
461. See Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1342, discussed supra Part II.B.1; Krueger, 915 F. 
Supp at 595, discussed supra Part II.C.3. 
462. See supra Part I.D (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); see also supra Part I.A 
(discussing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
463. See supra notes 248 and 249 and accompanying text. 
464. See, e.g., Paddington, 966 F.2d at 577, discussed supra Part II.B.4; Kompan, 
890 F. Supp at 1167, discussed supra notes 24, 132 and accompanying text. 
465. 966 F.2d 577; see supra Part II.B.4. 
466. 568 F.2d 1342; see supra Part II.B.1. 
467. 812 F.2d 1531; see supra Part II.B.2. 
468. 659 F.2d 695, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); see supra Part II.B.3. 
469. Id. 
470. See Kompan, 890 F. Supp at 1167, discussed supra notes 24 and 132 and ac-
companying text. 
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dary meaning need not be demonstrated.471  If a product cannot 
pass all three prongs of the proposed test, then secondary meaning 
must be proven to warrant protection from infringement.  If neither 
inherent distinctiveness (using the proposed test) nor secondary 
meaning can be proven, then the trade dress is not subject to pro-
tection. 
CONCLUSION 
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court 
resolved a split in the circuits regarding trade dress protection. The 
Court held that trade dress is protectable based on a finding of ei-
ther inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning, and that a find-
ing of both was not required.  This either/or standard required 
courts to subsequently treat inherent distinctiveness and secondary 
meaning as separate links on a chain, as opposed to confusing the 
two concepts as synonymous terms.  Problematically, while the 
Court precisely defined what constitutes a finding of secondary 
meaning, the Court left the exact meaning of inherent distinctive-
ness undefined.  Thus, over the years district courts have devised 
homegrown recipes for determining inherent distinctiveness in 
trade dress, and the ingredients vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. 
A standard test to determine inherent distinctiveness in trade 
dress needs to be adopted nationwide.  Various incongruous tests 
are currently employed by courts across the country, producing 
circuit to circuit inconsistencies and widely varying results in trade 
dress protection litigation.  The proposed test is a clear, concise, 
immediately useable tool, which combines the best features of the 
various circuit tests being used today, and provides a uniform ap-
proach to determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress. 
 
471. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); discussion su-
pra Part I.F. 
